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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally brought by plaintiff James 
Sanchez ("plaintiff") against defendants Little America Hotel 
Corporation ("Little America"), Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA 
Architect & Associates, Okland Construction Company ("Okland 
Construction"), Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton 
Plumbing & Heating Company. (Second Amended Complaint, Record at 
pp. 51-83). Plaintiff's action against defendants sounds in 
negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and strict 
liability, to recover damages for injuries he sustained from 
diving into a swimming pool at Little America Hotel on July 5, 
1986. (Id.) 
Little America Hotel filed a cross-claim against 
defendants Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, and 
Okland Construction seeking express and implied indemnity. 
(Cross-claim Against Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & 
Associates and Okland Construction Company, Record at 125-28 and 
attached hereto in Addendum at pp. A6-10). The cross-claim for 
express indemnity was based upon the fact that Little America 
entered into a contract with Okland Construction and as part of 
the contract, Okland Construction agreed to indemnify and hold 
Little America harmless from and against all claims, damages, 
losses and expenses, including attorneys' fees growing out of 
their agreement to construct the swimming pool and sauna at Little 
America Hotel. (Id.) The claim for equitable indemnity was based 
on the fact that the conduct of Little America Hotel was passive 
and secondary in nature compared to the active and primary nature 
of the acts and omissions of the cross-claim defendants. (Id.) 
Defendants Martin Stern, Jr. & Associates, Okland 
Construction, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-HiLton 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. moved for summary judgment based upon 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967), "the Construction Statute of 
Repose." The district court granted the motion for summary 
judgment as to claims made by the plaintiff on the basis that 
plaintifffs complaint was time-barred under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-25.5. (Order granting Summary Judgment of Defendants 
Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, Rocky Mountain 
Pools, Inc., Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc. and Ok Land 
Construction Company, Record at pp. 366-68). 
Defendant Okland Construction subsequently moved for 
summary judgment as to the cross-claims of Little America. 
(Record at pp. 344-46). The district court granted the motion on 
the grounds that Utah Code Ann. §7 8-12-25.5 was a bar to Little 
America's cross-claims against Okland Construction. (Transcript 
of Hearing on Defendant Okland Construction's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Cross-Claim of Little America, Record at 512 and 
attached hereto in Addendum at pp. Al-2 3; Order Granting Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Okland Construction Company as to 
Cross-Claims of Little America, Record at 443-45 and attached 
hereto in Addendum at pp. A24-27). The judgment was certified as 
a final judgment. 
Defendant Little America-appellant filed a timely notice 
of appeal and requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
decision denying Little America's right of indemnification against 
Okland Construction on its claim for indemnity. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does Little America retain the right to seek 
indemnity from Okland Construction even if the plaintiff's action 
against Okland Construction is barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5? 
2. Does the seven-year Construction Statute of Repose, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, violate the Utah and United States 
Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The determinative Utah statutory provisions are: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25.5 (1967) — Injury Due 
to Defective Design or Construction of Improvement to 
Real Property -- Within Seven Years; and 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-23 (1953) — Within Six 
Years -- Mesne Profits of Real Property — Instrument 
in Writing — Distribution of Criminal Proceeds to 
Victim. 
The determinative Utah constitutional provisions are: 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §2 [All political power 
inherent in the people.]; 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §7 [Due process of law.]; 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11 [Courts open--redress 
of injury.]; 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §24 [Uniform operation of 
laws,]. 
The determinative United States Constitutional provision 
is: 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1. 
(All determinative authorities are set out in verbatim in the 
Addendum at pp. A2-5). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
THE CLAIM 
On or about September 11, 1975, Little America, the 
owner, and Okland Construction, the contractor, entered into and 
signed a standard form of agreement between owner and contractor. 
(Record at pp. 3 89-408 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. 
A28-48). Okland Construction was to perform all the work required 
by the contract documents for Little America. (Id. ) Under said 
contract Okland Construction was responsible for building the 
hotel, including the swimming pool and sauna. Among other things, 
the contract defined work in paragraph 1.13 as: 
The term Work includes all labor necessary 
to produce the construction required by the 
Contract Documents, and all materials and 
equipment incorporated or to be incorporated 
in such construction. (Addendum at p. A-35). 
Under said contract, Okland Construction was responsible 
for building the hotel, including the swimming pool and sauna. As 
part of the contractual documents, specifications set out in 
detail requirements for construction with respect to the swimming 
pool and sauna that were to be constructed by Okland Construction. 
(Record at pp. 410-418 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. 
A49-58). 
Okland Construction was contractually responsible for 
those performing the work. Paragraph 4.10.1 of the agreement 
between the parties provides: 
The Contractor shall be responsible to the 
Owner for the acts and omissions of all his 
employees and all Subcontractors, their 
agents and employees, and all other persons 
performing any of the Work under a contract 
with the Contractor. 
Okland Construction agreed to indemnify Little America 
under the terms of the contract between Okland and Little America. 
(Record at pp. 389-408 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. 
28-48). Paragraph 4.18.1 of that agreement contains the following 
indemnity provision: 
The contractor shall indemnify and hold 
harmless the owner and the architect and 
their agents and employees from and against 
all claims, damages, losses and expenses 
including attorney's fees arising out of or 
resulting from the performance of the work, 
provided that any such claim, damage, loss 
or expense (1) is attributable to bodily 
injury, sickness, disease or death, or to 
injury to or destruction of tangible 
property (other than the work itself) 
including the Loss of use resulting 
therefrom, and (2) is caused in whole or in 
part by any negligent act or omission of the 
Contractor, any Sub-constractor, anyone 
directly or indirectly employed by any of 
them or anyone for whose acts any of them 
may be liable, regardless of whether or not 
it is caused in part by a party indemnified 
hereunder. (Id. at Record at p. 399 and 
Addendum at p. 39). (Emphasis added). 
Moreover, Okland Construction agreed to purchase and 
maintain contractor's liability insurance sufficient to insure 
contractual obligations under the indemnity provisions of 
paragraph 4.18.1 of the parties' agreement. Paragraph 11.1.1 of 
the agreement provides: 
The Contractor shall purchase and maintain 
such insurance as will protect him from 
claims set forth below which may arise out 
of or result from the Contractor's 
operations under the Contract, whether such 
operations be by himself or by any Sub-
contractor or by anyone directly or 
indirectly employed by any of them, or 
anyone for whose acts any of them may be 
liable. (Ici. at Record at p. 405 and 
Addendum at p. A45). 
On or about November 15, 1978, the construction at Little 
America was substantially completed. (Record at pp. 211-12). On 
or about that date Little America took possession of the premises 
and began to use the facilities, including the sauna and swimming 
pool. 
On September 10, 1987, plaintiff James Sanchez filed a 
Second Amended Complaint against, among others, defendants Little 
America Hotel, Okland Construction, Martin Stern, Jr. & 
Associates, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc., and Higham-Hilton 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (Second Amended Complaint, Record at 
pp. 51-83). Plaintiff commenced the action against the 
aforementioned defendants seeking compensation for injuries 
suffered on July 5, 1986, when he dove into a swimming pool at 
Little America Hotel. (Id.) 
On February 17, 1988, defendant Little America Hotel, 
pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, filed 
a cross-claim against defendant Okland Construction and defendant 
Martin Stern, Jr. seeking contractual and equitable indemnity. 
(Record at pp. 125-28 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. 
A6-10). The cross-claim for contractual indemnity was based upon 
the fact that Little America entered into a contract with Okland 
Construction and as part of said contract, Okland Construction 
agreed to indemnify and hold Little America Hotel harmless from 
and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, including 
attorneys' fees growing out of their agreement to construct the 
swimming pool and sauna at Little America Hotel. (Idl. ) The claim 
for equitable indemnity was based on the fact that the conduct of 
Little America Hotel was passive and secondary in nature, whereas 
the conduct of Okland Construction was active and primary in 
nature. (1(3. ) 
On July 18, 1988 the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants Okland Construction, Martin Stern, 
Jr., Rocky Mountain Pools, and Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
Contractors with respect to plaintiff's complaint. (Record at pp. 
366-68). The court granted summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 on the grounds that more than seven years had 
elapsed from the time that the construction of Little America 
Hotel was substantially completed and the date that plaintiff's 
action was filed. (Id.) 
On August 4, 1988, defendant Okland Construction filed a 
motion for summary judgment as to the cross-claims of Little 
America. (Record at pp. 344-46). The district court granted 
summary judgment on defendant Little America's cross-claim in 
favor of defendant Okland Construction. (Record at pp. 443-45 
and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. A24-27). The court found 
that Utah Code Ann. §78-12.25.5 was likewise a bar to Little 
America's cross-claims against Okland Construction. (Id.; 
Transcript of Hearing on Defendant Okland Construction's Motion 
for Summary Judgment as to Cross-Claim of Little America, Record 
at p. 512 and attached hereto in Addendum at pp. All-23). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Little America retains the right to seek indemnity from 
Okland Construction even if plaintiff's action against Okland 
Construction is barred by the Construction Statute of Repose. 
Little America's claim for indemnity is not governed by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 c Little America's cross-claim for indemnity is 
separate and distinct from and is not governed by the statute of 
limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying action. Little 
America's claim for contractual indemnity is governed by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-23, the six-year statute of limitations applicable to 
contract actions. Also, under general principles, Little 
America's claim for indemnity is not barred. Based upon the 
foregoing, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not govern Little 
America's cross-claim against Okland Construction for indemnity. 
Assuming arguendo, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is 
applicable to Little America's cross-claim for indemnity, the 
Construction Statute of Repose is unconstitutional. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates the constitutional guarantee of Little 
America's right of access to the courts. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-25.5 is a class legislation and violates equal protection 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 also violates due process. The 
Construction Statute of Repose, on its face, prohibits Little 
America from bringing its action for indemnity because plaintiff's 
underlying action is barred by the statutory seven-year period 
notwithstanding that defendant's indemnity action did not accrue 
upon completion of the premises in question. This absolute bar is 
arbitrary and discriminatory and violates the Utah and United 
States Constitution, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
LITTLE AMERICA'S CROSS-CLAIM FOR INDEMNITY 
AGAINST OKLAND CONSTRUCTION IS NOT GOVERNED 
BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5. 
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction 
is not barred by the Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967). Little America's claim for indemnity is 
separate and distinct from and is not governed by the statute of 
limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying action. 
Moreover, Little America's claim for indemnity, based upon an 
express contract with Okland Construction, is governed by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-23 (1953), the six-year statute of limitations 
applicable to actions on written contracts. Finally, under 
general principles, Little America's claim for equitable indemnity 
does not accrue and the limitations period does not begin to run 
until the litigation against it has ended or liability, if any, 
has been discharged. 
A* Little America's Cross-Claim for Indemnity is 
Separate and Distinct From and is not Governed by 
the Statute of Limitations Applicable to Plaintiff's 
Underlying Action. 
This Court recognized in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale 
Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984), that "the statute of 
limitations on an indemnity action does not begin to run until the 
cause of action accrues, even though the statute of limitations on 
the underlying action may already have run." At issue in Perry 
was whether a purchaser of goods could obtain indemnity from a 
manufacturer-supplier for damages that the purchaser was forced to 
pay by reason of an alleged breach of warranty even though the 
purchaser did not file its indemnification action until after the 
statute of limitations had run on the underlying cause of action. 
Id. at 217. In denying the claim for indemnity, this Court relied 
upon an absolute limitation period specified in the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code which conflicted with the general limitations rule 
for indemnity actions. 
This Court has not specifically addressed whether one 
tort-feasor can recover indemnity from a second tort-feasor in a 
third-party action if the plaintiff's direct right of action 
against the latter is barred by a statute of limitations. This 
Court has, however, addressed a similar issue as to whether an 
action involving a claim for contribution was barred because the 
underlying claim was filed after the applicable statute of 
limitations in Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 
P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984). 
In Unigard, an insurer which had settled a lawsuit 
arising out of an automobile collision in the City of LaVerkin 
(the "City"), sued the City for contributory negligence as a joint 
tort-feasor, based on the City's failure to keep a "yield" sign 
free from obstruction by foliage. The City claimed that the 
action was barred because the insurer did not give the City notice 
within one year as required by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This Court held that the one-year provision of the Governmental 
Immunity Act was inapplicable to the claim for contribution. 
This Court found that a claim for contribution arises 
only when the defendant meets the conditions specified by the 
Comparative Negligence Act and therefore the one-year claim period 
was inapplicable. This Court stated: 
If the City's view prevailed that the action 
arose with the occurrence of the tort 
action, a plaintiff could destroy a joint 
tort-feasor's right of contribution by not 
bringing his action until after the statute 
of limitations had run on the defendant's 
action, (citations omitted) That result would 
be both inherently unfair as well as in 
conflict with the basic policy of the 
Comparative Negligence Act. . . . Id. at 
1346. 
Although Unigard involved an action for contribution, 
this Court's reasoning provides guidance with regard to Little 
America's cross-claim for indemnity against Okland Construction in 
the present action. Claims for indemnity and contribution are 
both derivative in nature. In other words, a cause of action for 
indemnity or contribution does not arise until an adverse judgment 
has been rendered or a settlement is made. A defendant's right to 
seek contribution or indemnity is distinct from a plaintiff's 
right to recovery. 
In analyzing the application of the statute of 
limitations on claims for indemnity or contribution, the fact that 
the claim is derivative is the key factor in determining the 
threshold question of when the cause of action accrues. Because 
of the derivative nature of a claim for indemnity or for 
contribution, case law interpreting at what point a cause of 
action for contribution accrues is analogous to and arguably stare 
decisis as to the determination of when a cause of action for 
indemnity accrues. 
Based upon the reasoning in Unigard, Little America 
retains the right to seek indemnity from Okland Construction even 
if plaintiff's action against Okland Construction is barred by 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. To find that Little America's claim 
for indemnity is barred by the Construction Statute of Repose in 
the underlying action would be "inherently unfair" and in conflict 
with the basic premise of indemnity. The applicable statute of 
limitation for plaintiff's complaint against defendants has no 
bearing on Little America's cross-claim for indemnity against 
Okland Construction. 
Other jurisdictions have likewise found that a third 
party's claim for contribution or indemnity is separate and 
distinct from and is not governed by the statute of limitations 
applicable to plaintiff's underlying action. See, e.g., Thornton 
v. Town of Hull, 515 F.Supp. 715 (D.Mass. 1981); Grimmer v. 
Harbor Towers, 183 Cal.Rptr. 634 (Cal.App. 1982); Valley Circle 
Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1983); 
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978); 
Castle Construction v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 425 So.2d 573 
(Fla.App. 1982); Toar Construction Co. v. GAF Corp., 267 S.E.2d 
6 35 (Ga.App. 19 80); State ex rel General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 
666 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. 1984); Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc., 
364 N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y. 1975); Methodist Hospital v. Leon D. 
DeMatteis Construction, 413 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.App. 1979); 
McDermott v. City of New York, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.App. 1980); 
Huff v. Shiomi, 699 P.2d 1178 (Or.App. 1985); and AMOCO Chemicals 
Corp. v. Malone Service Company, 712 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.App. 1986). 
The Supreme Court of California examined an issue 
identical to the instant action and concluded that a tort 
defendant retains the right to seek indemnity from another tort-
feasor even if the plaintiff's action against the cross-defendant 
was barred by the statute of limitations in Valley Circle Estates 
v. VTN Consolidated, Inc., 659 P.2d 1160 (Cal. 1983). In 1978, 
the plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages to their home. The 
defendants included the general contractor, developer and seller 
of the residence, Valley Circle Estates ("Valley Circle11). 
Valley Circle was a partnership comprised of numerous 
entities and individuals who were separately sued in the action, 
one of which was VTN Consolidated ("VTN")- The completion of 
VTN's services was certified on April 5, 1966. A notice of Valley 
Circle's completion of the residence was signed March 25, 1968, 
and recorded March 28, 1968. 
Valley Circle filed a cross-complaint for a declaratory 
relief to determine its equitable indemnity rights against VTN. 
Subsequently VTN filed a motion for summary judgment to compel its 
dismissal from the direct action asserting that as to it the 
action, filed twelve years after completion of its services, was 
untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The trial 
court granted VTN's motion. 
After its dismissal from the direct action VTN filed a 
motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal from Valley Circle's 
cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, again relying upon the 
applicable statute of limitations. The trial court rendered 
summary judgment in favor of VTN. Valley Circle subsequently 
appealed contending that under the common law rule "a cause of 
action for indemnity does not accrue until the indemnitee has 
suffered a loss through payment of an adverse judgment or 
settlement." icL at 116 5. 
The California Supreme Court was in agreement with Valley 
Circle's argument, in reversing its grant of summary judgment, the 
court stated: 
[T]he governing authorities, both in 
California and throughout the country, 
uniformly hold that a tort defendant's 
equitable indemnity action is separate and 
distinct from the plaintiff's tort action. 
The indemnity action, unlike the plaintiff's 
claim, does not accrue for statute of 
limitation purposes when the original 
accident occurs, but instead accrues at the 
time the tort defendant pays a judgment or 
settlement as to which he is entitled to 
indemnity. Id. (citations omitted). 
The court further stated that: 
A tort defendant retains the right to seek 
equitable indemnity from another tort-feasor 
even if the plaintiff's action against the 
cross-defendant is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 1^. (citations omitted). 
Likewise in the present case, Little America's cross-
claim for indemnity against Okland Construction is separate and 
distinct from plaintiff's underlying action. Little America's 
indemnity action did not accrue upon the completion of the 
premises at issue. Little America retains the right to seek 
equitable indemnity from Okland Construction even if plaintiff's 
action against Okland is time-barred. For statute of limitation 
purposes, Little America's express indemnity claim accrued by 
contract at the time any claim, damages, losses and attorneys' 
fees arise out of or result from any action which it is entitled 
to be held harmless. Little America's third-party claim for 
indemnity against Okland Construction is not barred because 
plaintiff's underlying action was brought more than seven years 
after the completion of the structures at issue. 
B. Little America's Claim for Contractual Indemnity is 
Governed by Utah Code Ann. $78-12-23, the Six-Year 
Statute of Limitations Applicable to Contract 
Actions. 
Little America's claim for indemnity is predicated upon 
an express contract of indemnity. Okland Construction expressly 
agreed to indemnify Little America against all claims in Paragraph 
4.18.1 of the standard form of agreement between owner Little 
America and contractor Okland Construction. Paragraph 4.18.1 of 
the parties contract is enforceable to require Okland to indemnify 
Little America for any liability it may incur as a result of any 
negligent act or omission of the contractor. 
Little America sought to enforce its contractual right of 
indemnification from Okland Construction when it filed a cross-
claim against Okland- Okland Construction denied Little America's 
claim for indemnity and argued that the claim was governed and 
barred by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. Little America's claim for 
indemnity, however, is based upon an express contract and thus the 
controlling statute of limitations is that with respect to 
contractual claims, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-23 (1953) provides, in relevant part: 
Within six years: 
* * * 
(2) an action upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in §78-12-22. 
* * * 
Under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23, a party may bring a cause 
of action based upon a breach of contract six years after breach 
of the contract. In the instant action, Little America and Okland 
Construction entered into the contract on September 11, 1975. 
Plaintiff was injured in 1986 and brought his action against 
defendants in 1987. Little America filed its cross-claim for 
contractual indemnity against Okland Construction on January 17, 
1988, well within the six-year statute of limitations with respect 
to actions on contracts. Little America's claim for indemnity is 
not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-22. 
This Court has not addressed the issue as to what statute 
of limitations governs a cause of action for contractual 
indemnity. However, on numerous occasions, this Court has found 
that actions based upon contracts are governed by the six-year 
limitation period found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2). See, 
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction, 744 P.2d 1370 
(Utah 1987) (Action by university against contractor for 
installation of defective pipe was an action founded on contract 
and subject to the six-year period of limitations). See e.g., 
Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370, 49 P.2d 
405 (1935); Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 
494 (1954); Amundson v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n, 
13 Utah 2d 407, 375 P.2d 463 (1962); Arnold Machinery Co. v. 
Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976); Upland Industries Corp. v. 
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984); Butcher v. 
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah App. 1987); Koulis v. Standard Oil, 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah App. 1987). 
Other jurisdictions have addressed the specific issue as 
to what statute of limitations governs an express contract of 
indemnity and have applied the statute of limitations applicable 
to contractual claims. See, e.g., Richards v. Gold Circle Stores, 
501 N.E.2d 670 (Ohio App. 1986): Insurance Company of North 
America v. Southeastern Electric Company, Inc., 275 N.W.2d 255 
(Mich. 1979); and Thermo King Corporation v. Strick Corporation, 
467 F.Supp. 75 (D.C. Pa. 1979). 
In Richards v. Gold Circle Stores, supra, the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio addressed an issue identical to the instant 
action. The issue addressed on appeal was whether the Ohio ten-
year construction statute of repose was applicable to an express 
contract of indemnity. Defendant and third-party plaintiff, Gold 
Circle Stores ("Gold Circle") appealed from a lower court judgment 
which found its third-party claim against Six Industries to be 
barred by an Ohio construction statute of repose, even though the 
third-party claim was predicated upon an express contract of 
indemnity. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the lower 
court's grant of summary judgment against Gold Circle. 
In 1982, plaintiff Richards brought its initial action 
against Gold Circle and others for personal injuries sustained 
from an explosion on Gold Circlefs premises. Gold Circle filed a 
third-party complaint against Six Industries seeking indemnifi-
cation pursuant to a provision of a construction contract which 
provided as follows: 
Six Industries shall indemnify and hold 
harmless Gold Circle against all claims, 
damages, losses and expenses, including 
attorney fees, arising out of or resulting 
from the performance of the work 
attributable to bodily injury caused in 
whole or in part by any negligent act or 
omission of Six Industries or of its 
subcontractors. Richards, 501 N.E.2d at 
672. 
Gold Circle contended that its action was predicated upon 
breach of the contractual obligation by Six Industries with 
respect to plaintiff's claim and thus the controlling statute of 
limitations was that with respect to contractual claims. 
Six Industries and the trial court took the approach that 
GoJd Circle's claim was governed and barred by Ohio's ten-year 
construction statute of repose, Ohio Revised Code §2305.131. Ohio 
Revised Code §2305.131 provides as follows: 
No action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for bodily 
injury or wrongful death, arising out of the 
defective and unsafe condition of an 
improvement to real property, nor any action 
for contribution or indemnity for damages 
sustained as a result of said injury, shall 
be brought against any person performing 
services for or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction, or 
construction of such improvement to real 
property, more than ten years after the 
performance or furnishing of such services 
and construction. This limitation does not 
apply to actions against any person in 
actual possession and control as owner, 
tenant, or otherwise of the improvement at 
the time the defective and unsafe condition 
of such improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of the injury or damage for 
which the action is brought. Id_. at 671. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio found nothing in R.C. 
§2305.131 which indicated an intent to bar claims by the owner of 
the improvement for breach of an express written contract for 
indemnity which was more than ten years after the construction. 
Id. at 673. In reaching this determination the court relied upon 
a prior Ohio Supreme Court decision which found the statute to 
apply only to actions which sound in tort not to actions in 
contract. The Ohio Supreme Court explained: 
The language selected by the General 
Assembly is uniformly used to describe 
tortious conduct. For example, the 
statute's use of the terms "defective" and 
"unsafe" to describe the improvements at 
issue distinguish the actions contemplated 
within the statute from warranty or other 
contractual claims. * * * 
* * * Torts arise from the breach of 
certain duties of conduct that are imposed 
by law for the protection of all persons 
within range of the harm or injury 
proximately resulting from such breach. 
Contractual duties, on the other hand, arise 
from the specific agreement of the parties 
to the contract. IcL at 673, citing 
Kocisko v. Charles Shutrump & Sons Co., 488 
N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1986) . 
Based upon this reasoning the Court of Appeals of Ohio 
determined that the legislative intent was to bar only a common 
law action for indemnity. The court, however, found no indication 
of a legislative intent "to bar a claim for breach of an express 
written contract merely because the contract which was breached 
was one for indemnity." Richards, 501 N.E.2d at 67 3. The court 
stated: 
[T]he parties entered into an express 
contract of indemnity, which requires Six 
Industries to indemnify and hold harmless 
Gold Circle, regardless of whether a common-
law right of indemnity might exist. Since 
Gold Circle is attempting to enforce an 
express contractual right of indemnity 
arising from a written contract, we see no 
reason to treat a breach of that contract 
any differently from any other breach of the 
contract merely because the contractual 
right conferred, presumably for a valuable 
consideration, is a right of indemnity. Nor 
do we find anything in R.C. 2305.131 
indicating that it applies to breach of 
express written contracts of indemnity. 
Although the statute could have expressly 
exempted such written contracts of 
indemnity, it also could have expressly 
included them, if that were the legislative 
intent. 
To hold otherwise would enable Six 
Industries to avoid the contractual 
obligation of indemnity, which it undertook 
when it executed the contract in question, 
by virtue of a statute enacted subsequent to 
the execution of the contract. Since, 
ordinarily, statutes of limitations may be 
waived, it is at least arguable that an 
express written contract of indemnity could 
provide that it would be applicable 
notwithstanding R.C. 2305.131. However, we 
find no such exception necessary even if 
valid, since we hold that R.C. 2305.131 does 
not apply to express written contracts of 
indemnity but, instead, has application only 
to common law and statutory actions for 
contribution or indemnity. Id. 
Based upon the foregoing the court reversed the lower courtfs 
grant of summary judgment against Gold Circle. 
In the instant action Utahfs Construction Statute of 
Repose, found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, likewise does not 
apply to the express written contract of indemnity entered into by 
Little America and Okland Construction. The Utah Construction 
Statute of Repose is distinguishable from the Ohio statute in that 
it does not bar any action for indemnity, equitable or 
contractual, which arises out of a defective or unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property. If the Utah Legislature had 
intended the statute to bar claims for indemnity they very well 
would have included language similar to that in the Ohio statute. 
Under the Utah statute all claims for indemnity, contractual or 
equitable, may be brought separate and apart from claims governed 
by the statute. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not govern third-
party claims for indemnity. 
The language contained in the Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 
is similar to the Ohio Statute in that the terms solely describe 
tortious conduct. Examples of the key statutory terms in Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 which refer to tortious conduct are, among 
others, "defective and unsafe condition" and "proximate cause of 
the injury." The statute's use of this language is evident of the 
legislature's intent to cover only claims which sound in tort. 
Thus, Little America's claim based upon an express contract of 
indemnity is not governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. The 
trial court improperly applied Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 to bar 
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction for 
indemnity. 
The Michigan Supreme Court decision of Insurance Company 
of North America v. Southeastern Electric Co., Inc., 275 N.W.2d 
255 (Mich. 1979), also provides guidance to the instant action. 
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the trial court 
which denied a contractual claim for indemnity. The issue 
examined by the Michigan Supreme Court was whether a three-year 
statute of limitations relating to actions to recover damages for 
injuries to persons and property governed the contractual 
indemnity claim or whether a six-year statute of limitations 
involving actions to recover damages or sums due for breach of 
contract governed the action. The Michigan Supreme Court found 
that the six-year limitation period applied. 
Factually, in 1971 C & C Construction, the general 
contractor of a waste-water treatment plant project, entered into 
an agreement with defendant Southeastern Electric ("Southeastern") 
as subcontractor. Southeastern's responsibility as a 
subcontractor included the installation of transformers. The 
contract included a clause that Southeastern would "protect and 
save harmless" the contractor for any loss or damage to property 
occasioned by Southeastern. .Id. at 255. 
On April 5, 197 3, a fire damaged a transformer which 
C & C Construction was responsible constituting a loss of 
$92,502.94. Plaintiff insurance company paid C & C Construction 
$67,502.94 pursuant to an insurance policy which obligated 
plaintiff insurance company to pay for all losses in excess of 
$25,000. Three years and three weeks after the fire, plaintiff 
insurance company filed suit against the subcontractor 
Southeastern. The complaint alleged that the fire resulted from 
an employee being away from his job in breach of the contract to 
install the transformers. 
Southeastern moved for accelerated judgment based on the 
fact that the three-year statute of limitations had run. The 
trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed the decision of 
the trial court contending that the six-year statute of 
limitations applied since the suit was founded on an express 
contract of indemnity between the subcontractor and the 
contractor. 
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that the action 
rested on an alleged breach of an express contract of indemnity. 
The contractual right to indemnity was established in 1971, the 
damage was incurred on April 5, 197 3. Thus the court found that: 
The action is not one "to recover damages 
for injuries to persons and property," but, 
rather, is one "to recover damages or sums 
due for breach of contract" so that the 
period of limitations is six years, running 
from April 5, 197 3 when the indemnitee 
sustained the loss. Icl. at 256. 
The instant action is likewise governed by the Utah six-
year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions, Utah 
Code. Ann. §78-12-23. Little America's third-party complaint 
against Okland Construction is founded upon an express contract of 
indemnity entered into by the parties in 1975. Plaintiff's action 
against defendants is to recover damages for injuries sustained as 
a result of an alleged construction defect. Plaintiff's actions 
are governed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25*5, whereas, Little 
America's third-party action is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-23, the six-year statute of limitations. Little America's 
action against Okland Construction is to recover damages or sums 
due for breach of the parties' express contract. 
The damage which Okland Construction agreed to "protect 
and save harmless" occurred on July 5, 1986. Little America filed 
its third-party action for indemnity on January 17, 1988. Clearly 
Little America's action based upon the express contract of 
indemnity is not barred by the applicable six-year statute of 
limitation, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23. 
C. Under General Principles Little America's Claim for 
Equitable Indemnity does not Accrue Until Litigation 
Against the Third-Party Plaintiff has Ended or 
Liability has Been Discharged. 
Little America retains the right to seek indemnity from 
Okland Construction even if the trial court determined that 
plaintiff's action against Okland Construction was barred by the 
Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. Under 
general principles, Little America's claim for equitable indemnity 
does not accrue until litigation against it has ended or 
liability, if any, has been discharged. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), 
has recognized that, as a general rule, "a cause of action for 
indemnity does not arise until the liability of the party seeking 
indemnity results in his damage, either through payment of a sum 
clearly owed or through the injured party's obtaining an 
enforceable judgment." Idl. at 218. 
Other jurisdictions likewise recognize the virtually 
universal rule that a claim for indemnity does not begin to accrue 
and the limitations period does not begin to run until the 
indemnitee's liability is fixed, when it pays the underlying claim 
or a judgment on it. See, e.g., Penn Central Corp. v. Checker Cab 
Company, 488 F.Supp. 1225 (D.C. Mich. 1980); Duncan v. Schuster-
Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978); Mims Crane Service, 
Inc. v. Insley Manufacturing Corp., 226 So.2d 836 (Fla.App. 1969); 
Castle Construction v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 425 So.2d 573 
(Fla.App. 1982); May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 
543 P.2d 1159 (Idaho 1975); Smith v. Ly, 498 So.2d 128 (La.App. 
1986); State ex rel General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 
764 (Mo. 1984); Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc., 364 
N.Y.S.2d 137 (N.Y.S.C. 1975); Methodist Hospital of Brooklyn v. 
Leon D. DeMatteis Construction, 413 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.S.C. 1979); 
McDermott v. City of New York, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y.App. 1980); 
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Southridge Towers, 476 N.Y.S.2d 299 
(N.Y.A.D. 1984). See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R. 3d 867 (1974) and 
cases cited therein. 
Courts have also applied this general rule of law to 
causes of action for contractual indemnity. See, e.g., Venturi v. 
Austin Company, 681 F.Supp. 584 (S.D.Ill. 1988); Jones v. Laughlin 
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 45 3 F.Supp. 527 
(W.D.Penn. 1978); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. 
Tennessee Corporation, 421 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1970); Balboa 
Insurance Company v. Zaleski, 532 A.2d 973 (Conn.App. 1987); 
Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone 
Company of Maryland, 401 A.2d 101 (Del.Super. 1979); Allstate 
Insurance Company v. Metropolitan Dade County, 4 36 So.2d 97 6 
(Fla.App. 1983); Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 487 A.2d 658 (Md. 
1985); Simon v. Kansas City Rug Company, 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 
1970); Superintendent of Insurance v. Livestock Market, 709 S.W.2d 
897 (Mo.App. 1986); Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316 (Mo.App. 
1980); Fireman's Insurance Company of Newark, N.J, v. Antol, 471 
N.E.2d 831 (Ohio App. 1984); Pate v. Tellepsen Construction Co., 
596 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.App. 1980). 
The aforementioned general rule recognized by this and 
other jurisdictions is directly applicable to the instant action. 
The statute of limitations on Little America's cross-claim for 
indemnity did not expire before Little America filed its claim 
against Okland Construction. Little America was not untimely in 
asserting its claim for indemnity against Okland Construction. 
The timing of an indemnity cause of action was examined 
in the factually analogous case of Wolverine Insurance Co. v. 
Tower Ironworks, Inc., 370 F.2d 700 (1st Cir. 1966). Plaintiff 
Wolverine, a Michigan insurance company, sued as assignee and 
subrogee of an Ohio corporation, Families of Columbus. The 
defendant, Tower, was a Rhode Island corporation. On or before 
July 5, 1955, pursuant to contract with Families, Tower designed 
and installed a swimming pool on premises in Ohio owned by 
Families. On July 29, 1961, an individual, James Duckworth, dove 
into the pool, struck his head, and broke his neck. He brought 
suit against Families on the ground that the pool was negligently 
designed. As Families1 insurer, Wolverine undertook the defense 
and notified Tower of the suit with the request that Tower come in 
and defend. Tower declined and in 1964 Wolverine settled with 
Duckworth for $30,000. 
On November 12, 1965, Wolverine brought an action by 
filing with the district court a complaint in six counts. The 
court determined that counts five and six of the complaint stated 
a cause of action for common law indemnity that would be held to 
have accrued when Wolverine settled with Duckworth in 1964. In 
reaching this determination, the court applied the generally 
accepted rule that the cause of action for common law indemnity 
"accrues when the potential indemnitee suffers loss by paying the 
injured person." Id,, at 703. 
The court's conclusion was supported by considering the 
difficulties posed by the alternatives urged by the defendant --
that the cause of action accrued when the negligent act was 
performed or, at the latest, when the injury occurred. The court 
stated, "clearly it makes no sense to treat Duckworth's cause of 
action against Tower as accruing before he was actually injured. 
Similarly, we think, it makes no real sense to treat Families' 
cause as accruing before then, at a time when the liability is 
only potential and its nature purely speculative." Id. at 704. 
Under such circumstances the court found that it was "reluctant to 
punish a litigant for failure to press his claim at an earlier 
date, where had he done so, he would not have been entitled to a 
judgment." Id. 
Moreover, the court recognized that if the period of 
limitations began to run at the time of injury, Families would 
face a dilemma of equally unsatisfactory implications. If it were 
for its own protection to institute an action against Tower 
without waiting for Duckworth's possible claim to materialize, it 
would be starting the litigation whose precondition might never 
come into existence. The court stated, "that is, the injured 
person might not press his claim, might seek recovery on some 
ground other than Tower's negligence, or might be barred by some 
factor (such as contributory negligence) not pertinent to Tower." 
Id. Under this dilemma the court determined that the result would 
be the institution of many untimely unnecessary lawsuits. 
The reasoning expoused by Wolverine is dispositive of the 
case at bar. Clearly it makes no sense to treat Little America's 
action for indemnity as accruing before plaintiff's cause of 
action, which arose when he was injured in July, 1986. As such, 
the statutory period of limitations under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-25.5 should not allow Okland Construction to escape any 
liability for its negligence. 
POINT II. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-25.5 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Assuming, arguendo, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is 
applicable to Little America's claim for indemnity against Okland 
Construction, the statute is unconstitutional on several grounds. 
First, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates Little America's right 
of access to the courts. The statute bars Little America from 
seeking its claim for indemnity against Okland Construction prior 
to its right to indemnity ever accrued. Additionally, the statute 
unconstitutionally denies owners of reality, upon discovery of a 
defect, the right to sue the general contractor who designed, 
planned, or supervised the construction, and that acts to 
terminate all rights against that responsible party. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is additionally unconstitu-
tional in that the statute's classification for immunity from 
lawsuits violates equal protection. The statute provides a 
special and unusual immunity to the class identified in the 
statute as persons "performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction, or construction of such improvement 
to real property." This classification violates equal protection 
because there is no sound basis upon which to distinguish the 
favored class from owners which are specifically excluded by the 
statute. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due 
process because the statute bars Little America from bringing its 
cause of action for indemnity before its cause of action accrued. 
The statute abrogates the rights of citizens to their day in court 
and indeed, in the case of those seeking indemnity for claims of 
those injured, violates a vested and constitutionally protected 
right. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 Violates Little America's 
Right of Access to the Courts. 
A recent decision issued by this court is dispositive of 
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. On December 
31, 1985, this Court issued its opinion of Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), holding the Utah Product 
Liability Statute of Repose, Utah Code Ann., §78-15-1 (1983), 
violative of the "open courts" clause of Article I, Section 11 of 
the Utah Constitution, as well as the Utah constitutional 
prohibition against abolition of wrongful death actions, Article 
XVT, Section 5. Little America respectfully submits that this 
Court's analysis in Berry is directly applicable to its 
constitutional challenge to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5. 
Berry was a wrongful death action instituted against the 
manufacturer of an aircraft in which plaintiff's decedent was a 
passenger at the time of the fatal crash. The plane was twenty-
three years old. The Products Liability Statute of Repose 
purported, on its face, to bar the action before the crash ever 
occurred. The statute prohibited any action for recovery of 
damages for personal injury, death, or damage to property more 
than six years after the date of initial purchase or ten years 
after manufacture. 
This Court explained the nature of a statute of repose 
and the constitutional limitations applicable thereto. Such a 
statute runs from a date unrelated to the date of injury and cuts 
off the right of the injured party, no matter how diligent he may 
be in pursuing his legal remedies. In other words, the statute is 
not directed to nuisance lawsuits. It is directed to and 
necessariJy affects meritorious claims and abrogates the right of 
action long before the cause of action ever accrues. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (Utah's 
"open courts" or "remedies" provision) is part of the Declaration 
of Rights provision. It declares that an individual shall have 
the right of a "remedy by due course of law" for injury to "one's 
person, property, or reputation." This Court explained that the 
guarantee applies even if the right that has been cut off had not 
technically been vested. Article I, Section 11 guarantees an 
opportunity for redress granted in a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner, Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply 
Assn., 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1984), and that provision cannot be 
reduced to "a useless appendage to the constitution.'1 Berry, 717 
P.2d at 675. This Court stated: 
A plain reading of Section 3 1 also 
establishes that the framers of the 
Constitution intended that an individual 
could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic 
individual rights. A constitutional 
guarantee of access to the courthouse was 
not intended by the founders to be an empty 
gesture; individuals are also entitled to a 
remedy by "due course of law" for injuries 
to "person, property, or reputation." 
The Legislature has the power to create new rules of law 
and cut off existing remedies -- but that power is limited. The 
prerogative of the Legislature must be balanced against the 
guarantees of Article I, Section 11, and this requires a two part 
analysis. 
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides the injured 
person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy. The 
Workers Compensation Act is an example of an acceptable 
alternative. Workers who were denied the right to sue their 
employers were provided compensative benefits. There was no such 
alternative remedy in Berry, supra, and there is none in the 
instant case. 
Defendant Little America has been denied the right to 
seek indemnity from Okland Construction, a party who entered into 
an express contract to indemnify and hold Little America harmless 
from and against all claims, damages, losses and expenses, 
including attorneys' fees growing out of their agreement to 
construct the swimming pool and sauna at Little America Hotel. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 acts to terminate all rights Little 
America has against Okland Construction for indemnification. 
The second aspect of the analysis under Berry requires 
consideration of the Legislature's motives. The Legislature's 
abrogation of a right of action under existing law may be 
justified, even in the absence of an alternative remedy, only if 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
Legislature's action, in furtherance of that action, is not 
arbitrary or unreasonable. 
The Utah Products Liability Act considered in Berry 
contained a unique provision (Utah Code Ann. §78-15-12) which 
identified the legislative objective. The statute proclaimed that 
it was directed to the reduction of the cost of product liability 
insurance and thus the cost of manufactured products. 
This Court concluded that the statute was unreasonable 
and arbitrary and, further, that the statute did not meet those 
stated objectives. The statute was unreasonable and arbitrary 
because the cut-off periods provided (six and ten years) were not 
related to the useful life of the products. The same is patently 
true in the instant case. Seven years is not the useful life of 
Little America's facilities or, for that matter, any building --
even under fictionalized accelerated depreciation schedules. 
Additionally, the Products statute did not vitiate, as 
required for a determination of constitutionality, "wide-spread 
social or economic evils." Berry, 717 P.2d at 680. This Court 
explained that the number of claims for damages arrived from 
defective products had not dramatically increased in Utah. Thus, 
the number of claims barred by the statute could not significantly 
affect insurance premium rates, particularly since rates are 
established on a national basis and not on the experience of a 
single state such as Utah. Finally, the statute would not have 
unfavorable consequence: It would not vitiate but rather would 
increase social evils; the statute would likely reduce the 
incentive of the manufacturing industry to take safety precautions 
in products having a useful life of more than six years. 
Again, this Court's analysis in Berry is here applicable. 
Nothing in the Legislative history of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-25.5 suggests that the Legislature was motivated by the 
same considerations which prompted passage of the Products 
statute. On the contrary, the Legislature was simply responding 
to a special interest group. In contrast to the Products statute, 
the Construction Statute of Repose sets forth no explanation of 
its objectives. The transcript of the House proceedings suggests 
that the Legislature was simply responding to a special interest 
group which demanded unabashed immunity from liability. The 
transcript of the Senate proceedings suggests that the statute was 
not even understood. It was presented as a statute of 
limitations and not as a statute of repose, 
Even assuming arguendo that the motives of each statute 
were the same, the Utah Construction Statute of Repose must fail 
for the very reasons stated in Berry. Studies have shown that 
97.9 percent of the claims against architects and others 
responsible for the condition of realty are brought within seven 
years of substantial completion of the project. FIC Quarterly, 
Fall 1978, at 47-48. After that time, injuries or damages are 
more likely the result of improper maintenance or other factors 
over which builders or architects have no control. On its face, 
the statute can thus have no appreciable effect upon the cost of 
insurance premiums and the consequent cost to industry. 
Also, the analysis in McGovern, The Variety, Polity, and 
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 
Am.U.L.Rev. 579, at 595-96, upon which this court relied in Berry, 
is necessarily applicable to the Construction Statute of Repose. 
Insurance rates are set on a national scale and the statutefs 
impact upon claims in Utah, already shown to be minimal, would 
necessarily have no effect on insurance rates. Additionally, the 
statute creates rather than minimizes an evil. It necessarily 
reduces the incentive to commit substantial resources for long-
term building safety. Accordingly, the statute before this Court 
stands without justification, without sound reason for its 
existence. 
Additionally, Berry is applicable to the instant action 
in that this court relied upon decisions of sister states which 
have held realty statutes of repose violative of "open courts" 
provisions: Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Overland 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Simons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1979); 
Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Assn., 349 N.W.2d 
419 (S.D. 1984); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 
(Wyo. 1980); Berry, 717 P.2d at 678. Furthermore, this Court 
opined that the contrary authorities "have all but read those 
('open courts') constitutional provisions out of their respective 
Constitutions." Id. at 678. 
Moreover, this Court's decision in Berry also establishes 
that this Court's earlier decision in Good v. Christiansen, 527 
P.2d 223 (Utah 1974), sustaining the constitutionality of the 
seven-year statute of repose is not conclusive upon the matter. 
The general rule was stated in Malan v. Lewis, 69 3 P.2d 661, 
668-69 (Utah 1984): ". . .a ruling that a statute is 
constitutional does not thereafter become immune from 
reconsideration." The effect of the Good decision was 
specifically noted in Berry. This Court explained that the filing 
in Good was a one-sentence conclusionary statement that the 
statute was constitutional, that there was no way of determining 
the basis of the ruling, and that the decision "has little 
persuasive effect." Berry, 717 P. 2d at 683,, 
B. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is a Class Legislation 
and Violates Equal Protection. 
Irrational classifications which serve no sound statutory 
purpose are prohibited by: the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which mandates equal protection of the laws; Article 
I, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that the 
government is founded on the authority of the people "for their 
equal protection and benefit;" and Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution, which provides that "all laws of general nature 
shall have uniform operation." All provisions require that all 
similarly circumstanced persons shall be treated alike. 
The test of constitutionality for a statute which accords 
different treatment to persons by placing them in classes was 
stated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971): 
A classification "must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial 
relation to the object of the legislation, 
so that all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike." 
The test in this state was set forth in State v. Mason, 
94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938): 
A denial of the law's equal protection 
presupposes an unreasonable discrimination 
between those included and those excluded 
from the Act whether the Act confers a 
privilege or a right or imposes a duty or an 
obligation. . . . For that reason, to be 
unconstitutional the discrimination must be 
unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification 
is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its 
inclusion or exclusion features so long as 
there is some basis for the differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included 
as compared to those excluded from Its 
operation, provided the differentiation 
bears a reasonable relation to the purposes 
to be accomplished by the Act. 
* * * 
The objects and purposes of a law present 
the touchstone for determining proper and 
improper classifications. 
The Utah Construction Statute of Repose creates classes 
which fail to satisfy the constitutional mandate. Directly 
relevant to the instant action, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 
specifically excludes owners of the real estate from its benefits. 
The statute immunizes only contractors and architects, i.e., those 
who design, plan, and construct the improvement. The transcript 
of the Legislative proceedings makes plain that the solitary 
legislative objective was to respond to the demands of a special 
interest group, i.e., contractors and architects, and to terminate 
their liability — irrespective of their degree of culpability — 
upon the conclusion of seven years. 
The discriminatory character of the statute is apparent 
on its face and is constitutionally invalid under either "minimum 
scrutiny" or the rational basis standard of review established in 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1981) (Whether the class bears a reasonable relation to the 
purpose of the legislation). The authorities have concluded that 
it is difficult to rationally permit the owner to be exposed to 
liability for the prescribed period of years, when at the same 
time the builder or designer of the premises is immunized from 
liability even before the cause of action accrues. 
The seminal decision was authored by Mr. Justice 
Schaeffer in Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). The 
statute of repose under consideration was the same as that before 
this Court. The favored class was those who perform and furnish 
the "design, planning, supervision of construction, or 
construction of improvements to real property." Holding the 
statute unconstitutional, the court hypothesized the very 
circumstances before this Court: 
More important is the fact that all of those 
whose negligence in connection with the 
construction of an improvement to real 
estate might result in damage to property or 
injury to person more than four years [the 
period provided in the Illinois state] after 
construction is completed, the statute 
singles out the architect and the 
contractor, and grants them immunity. It is 
not at all inconceivable that the owner or 
person in control of such an improvement 
might be held liable for damage or injury 
that results from a defective condition for 
which the architect or contractor is in fact 
is responsible. Not only is the owner or 
person in control given no immunity; the 
statute takes away his action for indemnity 
against the architect or contractor. Id. at 
591. 
The situation addressed in Skinner is identical to the 
case at bar. The Utah statute provides no immunity to owners such 
as Little America who might be found liable for plaintiff's 
injuries that are results from a defective condition which Okland 
Construction is responsible. Moreover, the statute arbitrarily 
takes away Little America!s action for indemnity against the 
contractor, Okland Construction. 
The authorities have lent their approbation to Justice 
Schaeffer1s analysis. Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, 572 (Hawaii 
1973); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, 241 S.E.2d 739, 
741 (S.C. 1978); Kallas Millwork Corporation v. Square D Co., 225 
N.W.2d 454, 459 (Wis. 1975); Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, 563 
P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Henderson Clay Products, Inc. v. Edgar Wood 
& Associates, Inc., 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982) 
In Kallas Millwork Corporation v. Square D Co., supra, 
the court could not find "any real differences to distinguish the 
favored class -- those persons who perform and furnish the 
'design, planning, supervision of construction or construction' of 
improvements to real property -- from other classes, such as 
materialmen, who are ignored by the statute, and owners and 
occupants, who are specifically excepted." Kallas, 255 N.W.2d at 
458. Both Fujioka v. Kam, supra, and Loyal Order of Moose v. 
Cavaness, supra, reached a similar conclusion. The Fuj ioka court 
concluded that it was "unable to see any rational basis for 
treating the engineer and the contractor differently from the 
owners under the same circumstances." Fujioka, 514 P.2d at 571. 
In Loyal Order of Moose v. Cavaness, adopting the analysis in 
Fuj ioka, the court explained: 
It is clear that the classification does not 
rest upon some reasonable consideration of 
differences (between the classes under the 
same circumstances), which have a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation. Nor is the classification 
founded upon a reasonable distinction or 
difference necessitated by state policy. A 
statute making such an unsupportable 
classification fails to meet the 
requirements of the Equal Protection 
Guaranty. Loyal Order of Moose, 56 3 P.2d at 
148. 
The classifications set forth in the Utah Construction 
Statute of Response likewise fail to meet Equal Protection. The 
discriminatory character of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is apparent 
on its face and is constitutionally invalid. There is no rational 
basis for treating the favored class differently from the owners 
under the same circumstances. 
C. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25,5 Violates Due Process. 
Both Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Section VII of Article I of the Utah Constitution 
provide that no person shall be deprived of property without due 
process of law. 
The due process constraints where discussed in Wilson v. 
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902). Although the court considered a 
statute of limitations and not a statute which, as in the instant 
case, purports to bar claims before they come into existence, the 
Court's observations are instructive: 
[I]t may be properly conceded that all 
statutes of limitation must proceed on the 
idea that the party has full opportunity 
afforded him to try his right in the courts. 
A statute could not bar the existing rights 
of claimants without affording this 
opportunity; if it should attempt to do so, 
it would not be a statute of limitations, 
but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights 
arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport 
of its provisions. It is essential that 
such statutes allow a reasonable time that 
after they take effect for the commencement 
of suits upon existing causes of action. 
The Utah Construction Statute of Repose violates the 
foregoing provision in that it does not merely limit the time 
within which an action must be brought, but removes the remedy. 
Assuming arguendo Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 applies to the 
instant action, it bars Little America from bringing its claim for 
indemnity even before that claim has accrued. 
The essential requirement of due process is that every 
citizen shall be afforded his day in court. Celebrity Club, Inc. 
v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). It 
is the policy of this state to resolve any doubt by permitting the 
parties the opportunity to prove their claims. The effect of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 denies Little America its day in court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Little America's cross-claim against Okland Construction 
is not barred by the Construction Statute of Repose, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 (1967). Little America's cross-claim for 
indemnity is separate and distinct from and is not governed by the 
statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's underlying 
action. Moreover, Little America's claim for indemnity, based 
upon an express contract with Okland Construction, is governed by 
the six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions on 
written contracts, Utah Code Ann. §78-12.23 (1953). Finally, 
Little America's claim for indemnity, under general principles, 
does not accrue and the limitations period does not begin to run 
until the litigation against it has ended or liability, if any, 
has been discharged. 
Even assuming arguendo Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 applies 
to Little America's cross-claim for indemnity, the statute is 
unconstitutional. The statute violates Little America's 
constitutional guarantee of right to access to the courts. The 
statute's classifications violate equal protection. Furthermore, 
the statute violates due process because it bars Little America 
from bringing its cause of action for indemnity before it accrued. 
For the foregoing reasons and upon the authorities cited, 
Little America respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's decision denying Little America's right of 
indemnification against Okland Construction and declare Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 unconstitutional. 
Respectfully submitted this / fo/^&y of March, 1989. 
STRONG S/HAMNI 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Plaintiff Little America Hotel 
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A2 
UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-25.5 INJURY DUE TO DEFECTIVE DESIGN OR 
CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY -- WITHIN SEVEN 
YEARS. 
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any 
injury to the person, of for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for damages sustained on 
account of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean the date of 
issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the owner, architect, engi 
neer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use or possession of the improve 
ment on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in the actual 
possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defec-
tive and unsafe condition of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for 
which it is proposed to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise 
prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-12-23 WITHIN SIX YEARS - MESNE PROFITS OF 
REAL PROPERTY - INSTRUMENT IN WRITING - DISTRIBUTION OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDS TO VICTIM. 
Within six years: 
(1) an action for the mesne profits of real property. 
(2) an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instru-
ment in writing, except those mentioned in §78-12-22. 
(3) an action instituted under §78-11-12.5 regarding distribution of criminal 
proceeds to any victim. 
A3 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §2 [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on 
their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform 
their government as the public welfare may require. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §11 [Courts open « Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, prop-
erty or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, §24 [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
A4 
UNITED STATES CONSITUTION 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdicition 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiciton of equal protection of the laws. 
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~ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES SANCHEZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corpor-
ation, MARTIN STERN, JR. and 
AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOCIATES, 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a 
Utah corporation, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, HIGHAM-HILTON 
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., 
a Utah corporation and 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH III, 
Defendants. 
CROSS CLAIM AGAINST MARTIN 
STERN, JR. AND AIA ARCHITECT 
& ASSOCIATES AND OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Civil No. C87-268 
Judge David S. Young 
By way of cross claim against defendant Martin Stern, 
Jr., and AIA Architect & Associates and Okland Construction 
Company, the defendant Little America Hotel Corporation alleges 
that: 
A7 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. In the above entitled matter the plaintiff has filed 
suits against Little America Hotel Corporation and the cross 
claim defendants and other defendants alleging injuries and 
damages sustained by virtue of an accident that occurred in 
a swimming pool at defendant Little America Hotel's Corporation 
facilities in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. When defendant Little America Hotel Corporation was 
made a party to the aforementioned litigation, it tendered 
its defense in the above matter to cross claim defendants 
Martin Stern, Jr., and AIA Architects and Associates, and 
Okland Construction Company. 
3. The tender of defense was based upon the fact that 
Little America Hotel Corporation entered into a contract with 
the cross claim defendants and as part of said contract, said 
cross claim defendants agreed to indemnify and hold Little 
America Hotel Corporation harmless from and against all claims, 
damages, losses and expenses including attorney's fees growing 
out of their agreement to design and construct the swimming 
pool at the hotel facility of defendant. 
4. Based upon the agreement between the parties, defendant 
Little America Hotel Corporation is entitled to a judgment 
over against cross claim defendants for complete indemnity, 
-2-
A8 
attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in defending this action. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
5. Should a judgment enter against the defendant Little 
America Hotel Corporation and in favor of the plaintiff based 
upon an alleged act or omission to act on the part of Little 
America Hotel Corporation, then such conduct on its part was 
passive and secondary in nature to the active and primary 
nature of the acts and omissions to act of cross claim defendants 
entitling Little America Hotel Corporation to a judgment over 
against said cross claim defendants by way of implied indemnity. 
WHEREFORE, Little America Hotel Corporation prays judgment 
of indemnity and/or implied indemnity against Martin Stern, 
Jr., and AIA Architect and Associates, and Okland Construction 
Company, for its costs, attorney's fees, and such other and 
further relief as is appropriate. 
DATED this / ' day of /^C^4^^^^r , 198 8. 
STRONG {/HANNI 
Paul to. Be 
few? 
lnap 
-3-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * dMAC hsJb 
JAMES SANCHEZ, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
LITTLE AMERICA MOTEL, 
INC., ET AL, 
DEFENDANTS 
CIVIL NO. C-87-268 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
CROSS CLAIM OF LITTLE 
AMERICA 
* * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 29TH DAY 
OF AUGUST, 1 9 8 8 , COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:58 O'CLOCK 
A . M . , THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S . YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * 
FILED IN CLERK'S OrFiCE 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MATTHEW J . STOREY 
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOC. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
4 0 0 1 SOUTH 700 EAST 
SUITE #500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 7 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, 
OAKLAND CONST. CO. 
DWIGHT C. PACKARD 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
35 POST OFFICE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 1 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, 
LITTLE AMERICA: 
PAUL BELNAP 
STRONG & HANNI 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SUITE #600 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
FOR THE DEFENDANT, 
MARTIN STERN, JR. 
AIA ARCHITECTS & 
A S S O C : 
JEFFREY SILVESTRINI 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST 100 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 2 
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L ? . O C E E D I _ N G S 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THIS IS THE TIME 
SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER OF JAMES SANCHEZ VS. 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, C - 8 7 - 2 6 8 . 
THE MATTER HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO BE REPORTED. 
STATE YOU APPEARANCES FOR THE RECORD, PLEASE, COUNSEL. 
MR. PACKARD: DWIGHT PACKARD APPEARING ON BEHALF OF 
THE MOVING PARTY, OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. 
MR. BELNAP: PAUL BELNAP APPEARING ON BEHALF OF LITTLE 
AMERICA. 
MR. STOREY: MATTHEW STOREY ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, 
SANCHEZ. 
MR. SILVESTRINI: JEFF SILVESTRINI ON BEHALF OF MARTIN 
STERN AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOCIATES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. MR. PACKARD? 
MR. PACKARD: YES, YOUR HONOR. AS YOU WILL RECALL, 
APPROXIMATELY A MONTH AGO YOU DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION AGAINST THE PARTIES WHO PARTICIPATED 
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL TOWER BASED 
UPON THE STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED. 
WE'RE HERE TODAY ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS TO LITTLE AMERICA'S CROSS CLAIMS FOR INDEMNIFICATION 
AGAINST OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY. THE QUESTION FACING 
THE COURT THEN IS DOES SECTION 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 5 . 5 BAR ALL ACTIONS 
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AGAINST THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OF A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 
INCLUDING A CROSS CLAIM FOR INDEMNIFICATION BY THE OWNER 
OF THE PROJECT. 
YOUR HONOR, HAS THE COURT HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW 
THE MEMORANDA SUBMITTED? 
JUDGE YOUNG: I HAVE. 
MR. PACKARD: IN THAT MEMORANDA I'VE CITED TO THE PERRY 
V. PIONEER WHOLESALES CASE. IN THAT CASE THE PERRY COURT 
SET OUT A GENERAL RULE AS TO WHEN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INDEMNIFICATION ARISES, HOWEVER, THE COURT SET OUT AN 
EXCEPTION TO THAT GENERAL RULE AND STATED THAT WHEN A 
SPECIFIC STATUTORY LIMITATION PERIOD THAT SEEKS ULTIMATE 
REPOSE CAUSES OF ACTION, SUCH AS 78-12-25.5, THAT ACTION 
WILL CONTROL OVER A GENERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATION EVEN TO 
CUT OFF AN INDEMNIFICATION ACTION THAT TECHNICALLY HAS NOT 
ACCRUED. 
ALSO, IN THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE, A CASE 
WHICH SPECIFICALLY DEALS WITH THAT STATUE, THE COURT STATED 
THAT THE STATUTE PREVENTS THE OWNER, AS WELL AS OTHERS, 
FROM SUING THE DESIGNER, PLANNER, SUPERVISOR OR CONTRACTOR. 
THEREFORE, WE WOULD SUBMIT THAT BASED UPON THOSE TWO CASES 
ALONE THE COURT CAN RULE AND DISMISS LITTLE AMERICA'S CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION. IF THAT LANGUAGE FROM THOSE 
CASES IS NOT SUFFICIENT THEN WE WILL HAVE TO GO FURTHER. 
AGAIN, IN THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE THE COURT 
A15 4 
DISCUSSED WHAT CAUSES OF ACTION REMAIN AGAINST THE OWNER 
OF A PROJECT IF THE BUILDERS ARE NO LONGER INVOLVED IN THAT 
ACTION. AND THE COURT SAID THAT THE ORIGINAL OWNER CAN 
BE SUED FOR HIS OWN TORTS, IF ANY, THEREFORE, IF LITTLE 
AMERICA DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION 
AGAINST OAKLAND IT IS AS A RESULT OF THEIR OWN TORTS. 
NOW, IF WE HAVE TO INDEMNIFY THEM FOR THEIR OWN 
TORTS, AS THEY PURPORT THE CLAUSE OF THE CONTRACT REQUIRES 
THEM TO DO, THEN THAT CLAUSE VIOLATES SECTION 13-8-1 BECAUSE 
AN INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE CANNOT REQUIRE THE CONTRACTOR 
TO INDEMNIFY THE OWNER FOR ITS SOLE NEGLIGENCE. OKAY, SO 
BEING AS THAT IS THE CASE, LITTLE AMERICA DOES NOT HAVE 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST MY CLIENT. 
IF THE COURT HAS NO QUESTIONS I'LL SUBMIT IT 
TO MR. BELNAP AND THEN REPLY TO WHAT ARGUMENT HE HAS IN 
OPPOSITION TO WHAT I'VE ARGUED HERE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. PACKARD. 
MR. BELNAP? 
MR. BELNAP: YOUR HONOR, THERE'S BEEN A NUMBER OF CASES 
CITED IN BOTH MEMORANDUMS THAT GO BOTH DIRECTIONS ON THE 
QUESTION OF WHEN DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN TO 
RUN WITH RESPECT TO AN INDEMNITY ACTION. THERE ARE CASES 
THAT SAY IF THE UNDERLYING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE 
PERSONAL INJURY ACTION HAS RUN SO HAS AN INDEMNITY CAUSE 
OF ACTION RUN. THERE ARE CASES THAT GO TO THE CONTRARY, 
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WHICH WE FEEL ARE THE MAJORITY POSITION, THAT BASICALLY 
SAY—AND IF YOU THINK ABOUT THE REASON FOR THEM THEY MAKE 
SENSE—AND SAY THAT AN INDEMNITY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR STATUTE 
OF LIMITATION PURPOSES DOES NOT START TO RUN UNTIL THE PERSON 
REQUESTING INDEMNIFICATION IS CALLED UPON TO PAY OUT MONEY 
IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT SHOULD HAVE PAID UNDER EQUITABLE 
INDEMNITY OR, IN THIS CASE, UNDER CONTRACTURAL INDEMNITY. 
AND SO THE SIMPLE ISSUE AS WE SEE IT BEFORE THE 
COURT IS THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE FOR INDEMNITY 
BEGAN WHEN LITTLE AMERICA WAS SUED BY MR. SANCHEZ IN 1987 
FOR INJURIES HE SUSTAINED IN 1986. THAT IS THE FIRST TIME 
THAT A CLAIM WAS MADE AGAINST US. AND IN THAT CLAIM IT 
HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, OAKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION, WAS NEGLIGENT AND THUS BRINGS INTO PLAY THE 
CONTRACTURAL PROVISION THAT SAYS IF A CLAIM IS MADE AGAINST 
LITTLE AMERICA YOU WILL STEP IN AND HOLD US HARMLESS FROM 
THAT CLAIM, YOU'LL DEFEND IT, AND YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US IF 
THAT IS CAUSED IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY YOUR OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
WE'RE NOT STANDING HERE AND ASKING TO BE INDEMNIFIED FOR 
OUR SOLE NEGLIGENCE. THE CONTRACT DOES NOT GIVE US THAT 
RIGHT. THE CONTRACT SAYS THAT YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US IF YOU'RE 
NEGLIGENT IN WHOLE OR IN PART. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ACCORDING TO YOUR INTERPRETATION THEN 
ANY CAUSE OF ACTION THAT ALLEGES ANY DEFECT IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION THAT OCCURS AT ANY TIME IN THE TOTAL OPERATION 
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OF THE LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CAN, THROUGH THE INDEMNITY 
PROVISION, INCORPORATE OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION WITH THAT CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
MR. BELNAP: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. THAT WAS A 
CONTRACT NEGOTIATED FOR ON A $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 PROJECT AT 
ARMS LENGTH. IF YOU LOOK THROUGH THE CONTRACT I T ' S TOTALLY 
CLEAR THAT THAT'S THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES. FROM THE FIRST 
PAGE OF THE GENERAL CONDITIONS ON THROUGH THE END WHERE 
IT SAYS THE CONTRACTOR IS TOTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORK, 
THE WORK IS DEFINED IN VERY BROAD TERMS. IT GOES ON TO 
SAY THAT YOU'LL INDEMNIFY US, IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT YOU'LL 
GET INSURANCE TO PROTECT FOR THOSE INDEMNIFICATION PURPOSES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ISN'T IT ANTICIPATED THAT WOULD BE DURING 
THE PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION AND A PERIOD OF, I SUPPOSE, 
OCCUPATION BY THE TENANT FOR SOME TIME THEREAFTER AND A 
SHORT PERIOD SO THAT IT DEALS WITH FAULTY CONSTRUCTION? 
I MEAN, SHOULD OAKLAND CONSTRUCTION HAVE AN UMBRELLA POLICY 
AD INFINITUM FOR THIS PROJECT SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE THE 
BUILDERS OF IT IN ORDER TO INDEMNIFY LITTLE AMERICA? 
MR. BELNAP: LET ME GO BACK TO THE FACTS AND I'LL 
RESPOND TO THE COURT'S QUESTION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
MR. BELNAP: IN THIS CASE, JUDGE, LITTLE AMERICA HAS 
A SWIMMING POOL INSIDE OF THE HOTEL. MR. SANCHEZ CAME TO 
THE HOTEL TO STAY WITH HIS FAMILY AND HE ARRIVED THE DAY 
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BEFORE THE INCIDENT. HE GOT INTO THE POOL THE NIGHT BEFORE 
THE INCIDENT. HE USED IT BRIEFLY. THE NEXT DAY HE GOT 
INTO IT AGAIN, USED IT BRIEFLY AND THEN WENT AND HAD 
BREAKFAST WITH HIS CHILDREN, CAME BACK TO THE POOL AREA 
AFTER HAVING BEEN IN IT TWICE, AND HE WENT AND GOT IN THE 
SAUNA AT THAT TIME. AND HE GENERALLY CLAIMS THAT HE WAS 
IN THE SAUNA FOR A SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME THAT IT CAUSED 
HIM TO BE DELIRIOUS OR TO NOT BE IN TOTAL CONTROL OF HIS 
MENTAL FACULTIES SUCH THAT WHEN HE CAME OUT OF THE SUANA 
HE WAS HOT, HE WAS NOT THINKING STRAIGHT AS HE ALLEGES IN 
HIS COMPLAINT, AND WENT OVER TO THE POOL, DOVE IN AND BROKE 
HIS NECK. 
IT IS ALLEGED THAT THE SAUNA WAS IMPROPERLY 
CONSTRUCTED, WHICH IS A TOTAL PART OF THE JOB OF OAKLAND 
AS THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO PUT THAT SAUNA IN AND SEE THAT 
IT WAS CONSTRUCTED PROPERLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS 
AND SPECIFICATIONS. THAT'S CLAIMED BY VIRTUE OF IT NOT 
HAVING SOME SORT OF A TIMING DEVICE ON IT AND ALSO NOT HAVING 
WARNING SIGNS. IT'S ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SWIMMING POOLS, 
OR THE SWIMMING POOL, WAS NOT PROPERLY SIGNED AS FAR AS 
WARNINGS AND AS FAR AS DEPTH MARKINGS GO AND THE POOL AND 
THE SAUNA WERE IN THE SAME CONDITION AS WHEN OAKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION EITHER CONSTRUCTED OR SUPERVISED THEIR 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOTEL. 
SO IF YOU LOOK—IN ANSWERING THE COURT'S QUESTION, 
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IN VIEW OF THOSE FACTS, IF YOU LOOK TO THE CONTRACT TERMS, 
TO THE TYPE OF CONTRACT THAT'S INVOLVED, AND TO THE INSURANCE 
PROVISIONS THAT REQUIRE OAKLAND TO TAKE OUT INSURANCE FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THOSE INDEMNIFIED, WE THINK IT IS REASONABLE 
THAT THE CONTRACT BE ENFORCED ON ITS FACE AND THAT THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CASES CITED IN OAKLAND'S MEMORANDUM 
IN THIS CASE, NONE OF THOSE DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WHERE 
THERE IS AN EXPRESSED CONTRACT SUCH AS OCCURRED IN THE SHELL 
V. BRINKERHOFF CASE WHICH IS NOT IDENTICAL LANGUAGE BUT 
IMPORTS THE SAME REQUIREMENTS THAT WE'RE ASKING THE COURT 
TO ENFORCE IN THIS CASE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. BELNAP. 
MR. PACKARD: YOUR HONOR, TWO EXCEPTIONS TO LITTLE 
AMERICA'S ARGUMENT WOULD BE TO IGNORE THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
PERRY V. WHOLESALE CASE. WHATEVER IT IS IT'S QUITE EXPLICIT. 
IT CUTS OFF AN INDEMNITY ACTION THAT IS TECHNICALLY NOT 
ACCRUED UNDER A STATUTE OF REPOSE SUCH AS 78-12-25.5. 
AGAIN, WITH RESPECT TO HIS CONTRACTURAL 
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS, THE GOOD V. CHRISTENSEN CASE MAKES " 
IT CLEAR THE OWNER MAY ONLY BE SUED FOR HIS OWN TORTS, SUCH 
AS, THE LANDOWNER WOULD HAVE A DUTY TO HIS BUSINESS INVITEES 
TO MAKE A REASONABLE INSPECTION TO MAKE THE PREMISES SAFE. 
NOW, THAT ARISES AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PROJECT AFTER THEY TAKE POSSESSION. IF WE'RE REQUIRED 
TO INDEMNIFY LITTLE AMERICA FOR THOSE KINDS OF CAUSES OF 
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ACTIONS SUCH AS INSPECTING US AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY 
NEED A SIGN ABOUT DIVING INTO THE POOL THEN WE ARE 
INDEMNIFYING THEM FOR THEIR SOLE NEGLIGENCE. AND THAT MAKES 
THAT CLAUSE VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. THEREFORE, I 
SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THE COURT WOULD DISMISS THE CROSS 
CLAIMS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MR. PACKARD. 
ANYONE ELSE DESIRING TO BE HEARD ON THIS? 
MR. STOREY: NOTHING, YOUR HONOR, OTHER THAN TO SAY 
IT IS OUR POSITION WE SUPPORT MR. BELNAP'S ARGUMENT ON THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE INDEMNIFICATION CLAUSE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND MR. SILVESTRINI, WHERE DO YOU STAND? 
MR. SILVESTRINI: IF I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE 
I'LL GO FOR MR. PACKARD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BELNAP: JUDGE, I NOTICED IN REVIEWING OUR 
MEMORANDUM THAT WE MIS-CITED THE SHELL CASE, GAVE YOU THE 
WRONG PAGE NUMBER. I BROUGHT A COPY OF THAT DECISION FOR 
THE COURT IF YOU'D LIKE TO HAVE IT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I'D BE HAPPY TO SEE THE DECISION. 
MR. BELNAP: I ALSO BROUGHT A COPY OF THE DECISION 
OF THE WILLIAM V. KENNECOTT CASE CITED IN THE DEFENDANT'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM WHICH WE THINK ALSO SUPPORTS THE FACT THAT 
THIS INDEMNIFICATION CONTRACT IN THIS CASE IS ENFORCEABLE 
AS STATED IN THESE CASES BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, OAKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE CROSS 
CLAIM OF LITTLE AMERICA WILL BE GRANTED. I WILL READ THESE 
CASES AFTERWARDS AND IF I FELL THAT I SHOULD MODIFY MY 
DECISION I'LL ADVISE COUNSEL. AT THIS POINT THE DECISION 
IS GRANTED. 
MR. BELNAP: YOUR HONOR, MAY WE REQUEST THAT THIS BE 
CERTIFED AS A FINAL ORDER? 
JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT'S THE STATUS OF THE OTHER ORDERS 
THAT WERE GRANTED IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
MR. PACKARD: THEY WERE CERTIFIED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, YOU MAY AND I'D BE HAPPY TO HAVE 
THIS ONE CERTIFIED AS WELL. 
MR. PACKARD: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
MR. SILVESTRINI: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I 
AM A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT AS SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED 
THE HEARING OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME 
AND PLACE SET OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN 
SHORTHAND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD 
THEREIN; AND THAT THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID 
SHORTHAND NOTES INTO TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING 
TRANSCRIPTION IS A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF THE SAME. 
EILEEN/ M. AMEROSE,'C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1992. 
Eileen M. Ambrose, C.S.R. 
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ADDENDUM IV 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AS TO 
CROSS-CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA 
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Donald J. Purser, 2663 
Dwight C. Packard, 5005 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT 
A Professional Corporation 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-3555 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Okland Construction Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES SANCHEZ, 
V. 
Plaintiff, 
LITTLE AMERICA MOTEL, INC., 
a Utah corporation; LITTLE 
AMERICA REFINING CO., INC., 
a Utah corporation, d/b/a 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL; MARTIN 
STERN, JR. & ASSOCIATES; 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a 
Utah corporation; ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC.; a Utah 
corporation; HIGHAM-HILTON 
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., 
a Utah corporation and JOHN 
DOES I through III, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY AS TO CROSS-CLAIMS 
OF LITTLE AMERICA 
Civil No. C87-268 
(Judge David S. Young) 
Defendant Okland Construction Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to the Cross-Claims of Defendants Little America came 
on for hearing on August 29, 1988, the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Court Judge, presiding. Appearances were made on behalf 
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of Defendant Okland, Defendants Little America, Defendant Martin 
Stern, Jr. & Associates, and the Plaintiff, by their respective 
counsel. The Court heard argument and found that Section 78-12-
25.5, Utah Code Annotated was a bar to Little America's Cross-
Claims against Okland; 
WHEREFORE, for good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered 
that summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Okland 
Construction Company, and pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court further expressly determines that 
there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs the entry 
of final judgment dismissing with prejudice the cross-claims of 
Defendants Little America against Okland Construction Company. 
DATED this day of September, 1988. 
THE COURT: 
David S. /Sfour 
D i s t r i c t (gcn^ft Ju^c 
A 7 7 E S T 
H. D!XON HM^OLEY 
PL/, By V- 1 WAAAK 
700645.DCP 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING , 
J_f_ day of September, I hereby certify that on the "St)**5* 1988, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AS TO CROSS-
CLAIMS OF LITTLE AMERICA was served upon the following parties by 
placing the same in the United States mails, postage prepaid, and 
addressed as follows: 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Theodore Kanell 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dale F. Gardiner 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
•k^o;. a Q* ki»X£s_ 
700645.DCP 3 
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ADDENDUM V 
STANDARD AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER 
LITTLE AMERICA AND CONTRACTOR 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
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THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 
AIA Document A101 
Standard Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Contractor 
where the basis of payment is a 
STIPULATED SUM 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES; CONSULTATION WITH 
AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURACED WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMPLETION OR MODIFICATION 
Use only with the latest Edition of AIA Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction. 
This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contractors of America. 
day of Sep tember 
AGREEMENT 
made this £ l £ v £ N T t + 
Hundred and S e v e n t y - f i v e 
BETWEEN the Owner: LITTLE AMERICA REFINING CO. 
in the year of Nineteen 
and the Contractor: 
the Project: 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
1978 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
LITTLE AMERICA SALT LAKE 
the Architect: MARTIN STERN, JR. AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOCIATES 
9 34 8 S a n t a Monica B o u l e v a r d 
B e v e r l y H i l l s , C a l i f o r n i a 90210 
The Owner and the Contractor agree as set forth below. 
ARTICLE 1 
THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement, Conditions of the Contract (General, Supplementary and other 
Conditions), Drawings, Specifications, all Addenda issued prior to execution of this Agreement and all Modifications 
issued subsequent thereto. These form the Contract, and all are as fully a part of the Contract as if attached to this 
Agreement or repeated herein. An enumeration of the Contract Documents appears in Article 7. 
ARTICLE 2 
THE WORK 
The Contractor shall perform all the Work required by the Contract Documents for L i t t l e A m e r i c a 
(Here insert the caption descriptive ot the Work as used on other Contract Documents ) 
Salt Lake and additions and modifications to Little America Salt 
Lake, 500 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
ARTICLE 3 
TIME OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION 
The Work to be performed under this Contract shall be commenced S e p t e m b e r 15 , 1 9 7 5 
afleKacrapJerai 
(Here insert any special provisions for liquidated damages relating to failure to complete on time ) 
and be delivered to the Owner in a state of substantial completion ( 
defined in the General Conditions) as soon as possible but in not le 
time than scheduled hereafter: 
at 600 consecutive calendar days from the commencement 
date above, Guest Room floors 4 through 15 inclusive; 
Parking Levels P-l and P-2? floor 2; and floor 1, except 
for the areas bounded by column grid lines 1 to 5.1 and 
C to G, 2 to 6 and H to K, and meeting rooms #3, #4 and 
#6. 
at 740 consecutive calendar days from the commencement 
date above, all remaining portions of the project. 
(continued on attached sheet 2A) 
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS 
AIA Document A201 
General Conditions of the Contract 
for Construction 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS IMPORTANT LECAL CONSEQUENCES: CONSULTATION 
WITH AN ATTORNEY IS ENCOURAGED WITH RESPECT TO ITS MODIFICATION 
TABLE OF ARTICLES 
1. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
2. ARCHITECT 
3. OWNER 
4. CONTRACTOR 
5. SUBCONTRACTORS 
6. SEPARATE CONTRACTS 
7. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
8. TIME 
9. PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION 
10. PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY 
11. INSURANCE 
12. CHANGES IN THE WORK 
13. UNCOVERING AND CORRECTION 
OF WORK 
14. TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 
This document has been approved and endorsed by The Associated General Contractors of America. 
Copyright 1911, 1915,1918, 192S, 1937,1951, 1958. 1961, 1963, 1966, 1967, © 1970 by The American Institute of Architects, 1735 
New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006. Reproduction of the material herein or substantial quotation of its provi-
sions without permission of the AIA violates the copyright laws of the United States and will be subiect to legal prosecution. 
AIA OOCUMENT A201 • GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION • TWELFTH EDITION • »PRil 1970 EO 
AIA* • © W O • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS. 1735 NEW YORK AVENUE. NVV. V\ V>HIM.:( !S D C JOOOb 
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INDEX 
Acceptance of Defective or Non-Conforming Work 13.3 
Access to Work 2.2.3 
Accident Prevention 2.2.4, 10 
Addendum, Definition of 1.1.1 
Additional Costs, Claims for 12.2.1 
Additional Work 12 
Administration of the Contract 2.2 
Agreement, Extent ot 1.1, 1.2 
Allowances. Cash 4.8.1 
Applications for Payment 2.2.5, 9.2.1, 9.3.1, 9.3.3, 9.4.1, 
9.4.2,9.5.1,9.6.1,9.7.2 
Arbitration, Owner-Contractor Claims and 
Disputes 2.2.6 through 2.2.12, 7.10 
ARCHITECT 2 
Architect, Definition of 2.1 
Architect's Access to the Work 2.2.3 
Architect's Authority . . .2 .2 .2 , 2.2.12, 2.2.14, 2.2.17, 4.17, 12.1.2 
Architect's Authority to Reject Work 2.2.12 
Architect's Decisions 2.2.6 through 2.2.12 
Architect's Interpretations 1.2^,2.2.6 through 2.2.11, 12.1.6 
Architect's Full-Time Project Representative 2.2.16 
Architect's Status 2.2 
Architect's Visits to Site 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.15, 7.8, 9.7 
Bonds, Contract (Performance, Labor and 
Material Payment) 7.5 
Builder's Risk Insurance (See Property Insurance) 11.3 
Cash Allowances 4.8.1 
Certificates for 
Payment 2.2.5, 2.2.15, 5.4.2, 9.4, 9 J . I , 9.6.1, 9.7.2 
CHANCES IN THE WORK 12 
Changes, Minor 2.2.14, 12.3 
Change Orders 2.2.14, 4.8.1, 12.1 
Change Orders, Definition of 12.1.2 
Claims and Disputes Between the Contractor 
and the Owner 2.2.6 through 2.2.12, 7.10 
Claims for Additional Cost or Time 8.3.2, 8.3.3, 12.1.6, 
12.1.7,12.2 
Claims for Damages 7.4, 8.3 
Claims of the Subcontractor 5.3.1.4 
Cleaning up 4.16, 6.4 
Codes 4.7.2, 10.2.2 
Commencement of the Work 7 3 . 1 , 8.1.2 
Communications 2.2.2, 3.2.4, 4.9.1, 4.17 
COMPLETION, PAYMENTS AND 9 
Completion, Substantial 2.2.15, 8.13, 8.2.3, 9.7 
Contract, Definition of 1.1.2 
Contract Bonds 7.5 
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 1 
Contract Documents, Copies Furnished and 
Ownership of 1.3 
Contract Documents, Definition of 1.1.1 
Contract Documents, Execution, Correlation, 
Intent and Interpretations 1.2 
Contract Modifications 1.1.1, 1.2J, 12 
Contract Sum, Changes of 12.1, 12.2 
Contract Sum, Definition of 9.1.1 
Contract Termination by Contractor 14.1 
Contract Termination by Owner 14.2 
Contract Time 8.1.1 
Contracts. Separate 6.1 
CONTRACTOR 4 
Contractor, Definition of 4.1 
Contractor, Stopping the Work by the 9.6.1 
Contractor, Termination of the Contract by the 14.1 
Contractor's Liability Insurance 11.1 
Contractor's Relations with Subcontractors 1.2.4, 5.3 
Contractor's Responsibility for Protection 
and Safety 10.1, 10.2 
Contractor's Responsibility for Those 
Performing the Work 4.10 
Contractor's Review of Contract Documents 1.2.2, 4.2 
Contractor's Superintendent 4.9.1, 10.2-5 
Contractor's Supervision and Construction 
Procedures 4.3 
Contractors, Mutual Responsibility of 6.2 
Copies Furnished of Drawings and Specifications 1.3.1 
Correction of Work 13.2 
Cutting and Patching of Work 4.15 
Cutting and Patching Under Separate Contracts S3 
Damages, Claims for 7.4, 8.3 
Damages for Delay 8.3.4 
Day, Definition of 8.1.4 
Debris Removal 4.16, 6.4 
Deductions tor Uncorrected Work 13.3.1 
Defective or Non-Conforming Work, 
Acceptance of 133 
Delays and Extensions of Time S3 
Documents, Execution of the Contract 1.2.1 
Drawings and Specifications at the Site 4.12 
Drawings and Specifications, Ownership of 133 
Drawings, Arrangement of 1.2-4 
Drawings as Written Interpretations 1.23 
Easements 3.2-2 
Emergencies 10J 
Execution, Correlation, Intent and Interpretations 
of the Contract Documents 1.2 
Extensions of Time 8 J , 12.1 
Extras 12 
Failure of Payment 3-4 
Field Orders 133, 12-3, 1ZA 
Final Payment 5-7 
Fire, Extended Coverage, Vandalism and 
Malicious Mischief Insurance 11.3.1 
Governing Law 7.1 
Guarantee Bonds 73 
Guarantee 933, 1233 
Indemnification 4.18 
Information and Services Required of the Owner 3-2 
Inspections 2^.15, 7 J , 9.7 
Instructions to the Contractor 2-2-2, 3.2.4 
INSURANCE 11 
Insurance, Builders Risk (Sec Property 
Insurance) 11 J . I 
Insurance, Contractor's Liability 11.1 
Insurance, Fire, Extended Coverage 
Vandalism, and Malicious U I M hi«*r 11.3.1 
Insurance, Loss of Use 11.4 
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Insurance, Owner's Liability 11.2 
Insurance, Property . . . . . . . 11.3 
Insurance, Special Hazards . . 11J.S 
Insurance, Steam Boiler and Machinery 11.3.2 
Interest 7.9.1 
Interpretations and Decisions 
of the Architect 2.2.6 through 2.2.12 
Interpretations, Written 1.1.1, 1.2.5, 12.3, 12.4 
Labor and Materials 4.4, 4.5 
Labor and Material Payment Bond 7.5 
Laws 4.6, 4.7, 7.1, 10.2 
Liens .9.7.3, 9.7.5 
Loss of Use Insurance 11.4.1 
Materials, Labor and 4.4, 4.5 
Minor Changes In the Work .1.1.1,12.3, 12.4 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS . . . . . 7 
Modifications to the Contract 1.1.1, 12 
Mutual Responsibility of Contractors 6.2 
Non-Conforming Work, Acceptance of 
Defective or 13.3.1 
Notice of Testing and Inspections 7.8 
Notice to Proceed 8.1.2 
Notice, Written .73 
Notices, Permits, Fees and .4.7 
O W N ER 3 
Owner, Definition of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 
Owner, Termination of the Contract by the 14.2 
Owner's Information and Services 3.2 
Owner's Liability Insurance .11.2 
Owner's Right to Carry Out the Work 3.4 
Owner's Right to Clean Up 4.16.2, 6.4 
Owner's Right to Award Separate Contracts .6.1 
Owner's Right to Stop the Work 3 3 
Ownership of Drawings and Specifications 1.3.2 
Patching of Work 4.15 
Patching of Work Under Separate Contracts 6.3 
Patents, Royalties and 7.7.1 
PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION .9 
Payment, Applications for 2.2.5, 9.2.1, 9.3.1, 93 .3 , 9.4.1, 
9.4.2,9.5.1,9.6.1,9.7.2 
Payment, 
Certificates for 2.2.5, 2.2.15, 5.4.2, 9.4, 9 3 . 1 , 9.6.1, 9.7.2 
Payment, Failure of .9.6 
Payment, Final 2.2.10, 9.7 
Payments, Progress 93, 9.4 
Payments to Subcontractors 5.4 
Payments Withheld 93 
Performance Bond 7.5 
Permits, Fees and Notices 4.7 
PERSONS AND PROPERTY, PROTECTION OF 10 
Progress and Completion 8.2 
Progress Payments 93, 9.4 
Progress Schedule 4.11 
Project, Definition of 1.1.4 
Project Loss or Damage Insurance 113 
Project Representatives. Full-Time 2.2.16 
Property Insurance 11.3 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 10 
Regulations 4.7.2. 10.2.2 
Rejection of Work 2.2.12, 13.2 
Releases of Waivers and Liens .9.7.3, 9.7.5 
Responsibility for Those Performing the Work . .4 .10, 9.7.1 
Reta.nage 5.4.2, 9.7.3, 9.7.4 
Review of Contract Documents by the Contractor . . . . .1.2.2, 4.2 
Royalties and Patents 7.7 
Rights and Remedies . . 7.6 
Safety of Persons and Property 10.2 
Safety Precautions and Programs 2.2.4, 10.1 
Samples, Shop Drawings and 2.2.13, 4.13 
Schedule of Values 9.2 
Schedule, Progress 4.11 
SEPARATE CONTRACTS .6 
Separate Contracts, Owner's Right to Award 6.1 
Shop Drawings and Samples ..2.2.13, 4.13 
Site, Use of 4.14.1 
Special Hazards Insurance 11.3.5 
Specifications, Organization of 1.2.4 
Steam Boiler and Machinery Insurance 11.3.2 
Stopping the Work 3.3 
SUBCONTRACTORS .5 
Subcontractor, Claims of . . . . . . 53.1.4 
Subcontractor, Definition of 5.1.1 
Subcontracts, Award of . . . . . . . . .1.2.4, 5 . ^ 
Subcontractual Relations 5.3 
Substantial Completion and Final Payment 2.2.15, 9.7 
Substantial Completion, Date of 2.2.15, 8.1.3, 8.2.3 
Sub-subcontractor, Definition of 5.1.2 
Subsurface Conditions 12.1.6 
Successors and Assigns 7.2 
Supervision and Construction Procedures 43.1 
Superintendent, Contractor's 4.9.1, 10.2.5 
Surveys 3.2.1 
Taxes 4.6 
Termination by the Contractor 14.1 
Termination by the Owner 14.2 
TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT . . . . . . 1 4 
Tests 2.2.12, 7.8 
TIME 8 
Time, Definition of 8.1 
Time, Delays and Extensions of .8 .3 ,12.1, 12.2 
Title of Work 9.3.3 
UNCOVERING AND CORRECTION OF WORK 13 
Uncovering of Work 13.1 
Unit Prices 12.13, 12.1.5 
Use of Site .4.14 
Values, Schedule of 9.2 
Waiver of Claims by the Contractor 9.7.6 
Waiver of Claims by the Owner 9.7.5 
Warranty .4.5, 9.33 
.Words, Recognized Meanings of . . . . . . 1 . 2 . 3 
Work, Definition of 1.1.3 
Written Notice 73 
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A34 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE 
ARTICLE 1 
CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
1.1 DEFINITIONS 
1.1.1 THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
The Contract Documents consist of the Agreement, the 
Conditions of the Contract (Ceneral, Supplementary and 
other Conditions), the Drawings, the Specifications, all 
Addenda issued prior to execution of the Contract, and 
ail Modifications thereto. A Modification is (1) a writ ten 
amendment to the Contract signed by both parties, (2) 
a Change Order. <3) a written interpretation issued by 
the Architect pursuant to Subparagraph 1.2.5, or (4) a 
wri t ten order for a minor change in the Work issued by 
the Architect pursuant to Paragraph 12.3. A Modif icat ion 
may be made only after execution of the Contract. 
1.1.2 THE CONTRACT 
The Contract Documents form the Contract. The Contract 
represents the entire and integrated agreement between 
the parties hereto and supersedes all prior negotiations, 
representations, or agreements, either written or oral, 
including the bidding documents. The Contract may be 
amended or modif ied only by a Modif ication as defined 
in Subparagraph 1.1.1. 
1.1.3 THE WORK 
The term Work includes all labor necessary to produce 
the construction required by the Contract Documents, 
and all materials dnti equipment incorporated or to be 
incorporated in sucn construction. 
1.1.4 THE PROJECT 
The Project is the total construction designed by the 
Architect of which the Work performed under the Con-
tract Documents may be the whole or a part. 
1.2 EXECUTION, CORRELATION, INTENT AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
1.2.1 The Contract Documents shall be signed in not less 
than triplicate by the Owner and Contractor. If either the 
Owner or the Contractor or both do not sign the Condi-
tions of the Contract, Drawings. Specifications, or any 
of the other Contract Documents, the Architect shall 
identify them. 
1.2.2 By executing the Contract, the Contractor represents 
that he has visited the site, familiarized himself with the 
local conditions under which the Work is to be per-
formed, and correlated his observations with the require-
ments of the Contract Documents. 
1.2.3 The Contract Documents are complementary, and 
what is required by anv one shall be as binding as if 
required by all. Tho intention of the Documents is to 
include all labor Tv.\- t . \ , . • jmnment and other items 
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as provided in Subparagraph 4.4.1 necessary for the 
proper execution and completion of the Work. It is not 
intended that Work not covered under any heading, 
section, branch, class or trade of the Specifications shall 
be supplied unless it is required elsewhere in the Contract 
Documents or is reasonably inferable therefrom as being 
necessary to produce the intended results. Words which 
have wel l-known technical or trade meanings are used 
herein in accordance with such recognized meanings. 
1.2.4 The organization of the Specifications into divi-
sions, sections and articles, and the arrangement of 
Drawings shall not control the Contractor in dividing 
the Work among Subcontractors or in establishing the 
extent of Work to be performed by any trade. 
1.2.5 Written interpretations necessary for the proper 
execution or progress of the Work, in the form of draw-
ings or otherwise, wi l l be issued with reasonable prompt-
ness by the Architect and in accordance wi th any 
schedule agreed upon. Either party to the Contract may 
make written request to the Architect for such inter-
pretations. Such interpretations shall be consistent with 
and reasonably inferable from the Contract Documents, 
and may be effected by Field Order. 
1.3 COPIES FURNISHED AND OWNERSHIP 
1.3.1 Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Docu-
ments, the Contractor wi l l be furnished, free of charge, 
ail copies of Drawings and Specifications reasonably nec-
essary for the execution of the Work. 
1.3.2 Al l Drawings, Specifications and copies thereof 
furnished by the Architect are and shall remain his prop-
erty. They are not to be used on any other project, and, 
wi th the exception of one contract set for each party to 
the Contract, are to be returned to the Architect on re-
quest at the completion of the Work. 
ARTICLE 2 
ARCHITECT 
2.1 DEFINITION 
2.1.1 The Architect is the person or organization licensed 
to practice architecture and identified as such in the 
Agreement and is referred to throughout the Contract 
Documents as if singular in number and masculine in 
gender. The term Architect means the Architect or his 
authorized representative. 
2.1.2 Nothing contained in the Contract Documents shall 
create any contractual relationship between the Architect 
and the Contractor. 
2.2 ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONTRACT 
2.2.1 The Architect wi l l provide general Administration 
of the Construction Contract, including performance of 
the functions hereinafter described. 
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2.2.2 The Architect wi l l be the Owner s representative 
during construction and unti l final payment. The Architect 
w i l l have authority to act on behalf of the Owner to the 
extent provided in the Contract Documents, unless other-
wise modi f ied by writ ten instrument which wi l l be shown 
to the Contractor. The Architect wi l l advise and consult 
w i th the Owner, and all of the Owner's instructions to 
the Contractor shall be issued through the Architect. 
2.2.3 The Architect shall at all times have access to the 
Work wherever it is in preparation and progress. The 
Contractor shall provide facilities for such access so the 
Architect may perform his functions under the Contract 
Documents. 
2.2.4 The Architect wi l l make periodic visits to the site 
to familiarize himself generally wi th the progress and 
quality of the Work and to determine in general if the 
Work is proceeding in accordance wi th the Contract 
Documents. On the basis of his on-site observations as 
an architect, he wi l l keep the Owner informed of the 
progress of the Work, and wi l l endeavor to guard t 
Owner against defects and deficiencies in the Work of t 
Contractor. The Architect wi l l not be required to ma 
exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to check tl 
quality or quantity of the Work. The Architect wi l l not I 
responsible for construction means, methods, technique 
sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions ar 
programs in connection w i th the Work, and he wi l l n< 
be responsible for the Contractor's failure to carry oi 
the Work in accordance wi th the Contract Documents. 
2.2.5 Based on such observations and the Contractor 
Applications for Payment, the Architect wi l l determin 
the amounts owing to the Contractor and wi l l issu 
Certificates for Payment in such amounts, as provider 
in Paragraph 9.4. 
2.2.6 The Architect wi l l be, in the first instance, the 
interpreter of the requirements of the Contract Docu-
ments and the judge of the performance thereunder by 
both the Owner and Contractor. The Architect w i l l , 
w i th in a reasonable time, render such interpretations as 
he may deem necessary for the proper execution or prog-
ress of the Work. 
2.2.7 Claims, disputes and other matters in question 
between the Contractor and the Owner relating to the 
execution or progress of the Work or the interpretation 
of the Contract Documents shall be referred initially to 
the Architect for decision which he wi l l render in wri t ing 
wi th in a reasonable time. 
2.2.8 Al l interpretations and decisions of the Architect 
shall be consistent wi th the intent of the Contract Docu-
ments. In his capacity as interpreter and judge, he wi l l 
exercise his best efforts to insure faithful performance by 
both the Owner and the Contractor and wi l l not show 
partiality to either. 
2.2.9 The Architect's decisions in matters relating to 
artistic effect wi l l be final if consistent with the intent of 
the Contract Documents. 
2.2.10 Any claim, dispute or other matter that has been 
referred to the Architect, except those relating to artistic 
effect as provided in Subparagraph 2.2.9 and except any 
which have been waived by the making or acceptance 
of final payment as provided in Subparagraphs 9.7.5 and 
9.7.6, shall be subject to arbitration upon the writ ten 
demand of either party. However, no demand for arbitra-
t ion of any such claim, dispute or other matter may be 
made until the earlier of: 
2.2.10.1 The date on which the Architect has rendered 
his writ ten decision, or 
.2 the tenth day after the parties have presented 
their evidence to the Architect or have been 
given a reasonable opportunity to do so, if the 
Architect has not rendered his written decision 
by that date. 
2.2.11 If a decision of the Architect is made in wri t ing 
and states that it is final but subject to appeal, no demand 
for arbitration of a claim, dispute or other matter covered 
by such decision may be made later than thirty days after 
the date on which the party making the demand received 
the decision. Thf» failure to demand arbitration wi th in 
riod wi l l result in the Architect's deci-
l and binding upon the Owner and the 
vrchitect renders a decision after arbi-
; have been initiated, such decision 
evidence but wil l not supersede any 
ngs unless the decision is acceptable 
srned. 
: t wi l l have authority to reject Work 
inform to the Contract Documents, 
reasonable opinion, he considers it 
)le to insure the proper implementa-
3f the Contract Documents, he wi l l 
quire special inspection or testing of 
. nee with Subparagraph 7.8.2 whether 
or not such Work be then fabricated, installed or com-
pleted. However, neither the Architect's authority to act 
under this Subparagraph 2.2.12, nor any decision made 
by him in good faith either to exercise or not to exercise 
such authority, shall give rise to any duty or responsibility 
of the Architect to the Contractor, any Subcontractor, 
any of their agents or employees, or any other person 
performing any of the Work. 
2.2.13 The Architect wi l l review Shop Drawings and 
Samples as provided in Subparagraphs 4.13.1 through 
4.13.8 inclusive. 
2.2.14 The Architect wi l l prepare Change Orders in ac-
cordance wi th Article 12, and wil l have authority to order 
minor changes in the Work as provided in Subparagraph 
U.3.1. 
2.2.15 The Architect wi l l conduct inspections to deter-
mine the dates of Substantial Completion and final com-
plet ion, wi l l receive and review written guarantees and 
related documents required by the Contract and assembled 
by the Contractor and wi l l issue a final Certificate for 
Payment. 
2.2.16 If the Owner and Architect agree, the Architect 
wi l l provide one or more Full-Time Project Representatives 
to assist the Architect in carrying out his responsibilities 
at the site. The duties, responsibilities and limitations of 
authority of any such Project Representative shall be as 
set forth in an exhibit to be incorporated in the Contract 
Documents. 
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2.2.17 The duties, responsibilities and limitations of 
authority of the Architect as the Owner's representative 
during construction as set forth in Articles 1 through 14 
inclusive of these General Conditions will not be modi-
fied or extended without written consent of the Owner, 
the Contractor and the Architect. 
2.2.18 The Architect will not be responsible for the acts 
or omissions of the Contractor, any Subcontractors, or 
any of their agents or employees, or any other persons 
performing any of the Work. 
2.2.19 In case of the termination of the employment of 
the Architect, the Owner shall appoint an architect 
against whom the Contractor makes no reasonable objec-
tion whose status under the Contract Documents shall 
be that of the former architect. Any dispute in connec-
tion with such appointment shall be subject to arbitration. 
ARTICLE 3 
OWNER 
3.1 DEFINITION 
3.1.1 The Owner is the person or organization identified 
as such in the Agreement and is referred to throughout 
the Contract Documents as if singular in number and 
masculine in gender. The term Owner means the Owner 
or his authorized representative. 
3.2 INFORMATION AND SERVICES REQUIRED 
OF THE OWNER 
3.2.1 The Owner shall furnish ail surveys describing the 
physical characteristics, legal limits and utility locations 
for the site of the Project. 
3.2.2 The Owner shall secure and pay for easements for 
permanent structures or permanent changes in existing 
facilities. 
3.2.3 Information or ?ervices under the Owner's control 
shall be furnished bv tht- Owner with reasonable prompt-
ness to avoid delay m the orderly progress of the Work. 
3.2.4 The Owner shall «we all instructions to the Con-
tractor through the Arcnirect. 
3.2.5 The foregoing ire m addition to other duties and 
responsibilities of the Owner enumerated herein and 
especially those in respect to Payment and Insurance in 
Articles 9 and 11 respof_;.\.--.. 
3.3 OWNER'S RIGHT TO STOP THE WORK 
3.3.1 If the Contractor fails to correct defective Work 
or persistently rails to supply materials or equipment in 
accordance with the Contract Documents, the Owner 
may order the Cont rac t io btop the Work, or any por-
tion thereof, untii t'.e VJSC for such order has been 
eliminated. 
3.4 OWNER'S RIGHT TO C \RRY OUT THE WORK 
3.4.1 If the Contrac • . nts or neglects to carry out 
the Work in accorr. a ••••••
 :.h the Contract Documents 
or fails to perform ..'"• • \i<»on of the Contract, the 
Owner may, after e^ • • •-.- written notice to the Con-
tractor and withour .. • • jc:ce to any other remedy he 
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may have, make good such deficiencies. In such case an 
appropriate Change Order shall be issued deducting from 
the payments then or thereafter due the Contractor the 
cost of correcting such deficiencies, including the cost 
of the Architect's additional services made necessary by 
such default, neglect or failure. The Architect must ap-
prove both such action and the amount charged to the 
Contractor. If the payments then or thereafter due the 
Contractor are not sufficient to cover such amount, the 
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner. 
ARTICLE 4 
C O N T R A C T O R 
4.1 DEFINITION 
4.1.1 The Contractor is the person or organization identi-
fied as such in the Agreement and is referred to through-
out the Contract Documents as if singular in number and 
masculine in gender. The term Contractor means the 
Contractor or his authorized representative. 
4.2 REVIEW OF CONTRACT DOCUMENTS 
4.2.1 The Contractor shall carefully study and compare 
the Contract Documents and shall at once report to the 
Architect any error, inconsistency or omission he may 
discover. The Contractor shall not be liable to the Owner 
or the Architect for any damage resulting from any such 
errors, inconsistencies or omissions in the Contract Docu-
ments. The Contractor shall do no Work without Draw-
ings, Specifications or Modifications. 
4.3 SUPERVISION AND CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES 
4.3.1 The Contractor shall supervise and direct the Work, 
using his best skill and attention. He shall be solely re-
sponsible for all construction means, methods, tech-
niques, sequences and procedures and for coordinating 
ail portions of the Work under the Contract. 
4.4 LABOR AND MATERIALS 
4.4.1 Unless otherwise specifically noted, the Contractor 
shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment, 
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, 
utilities, transportation, and other facilities and services 
necessary for the proper execution and completion' of 
the Work. 
4.4.2 The Contractor shall at ail times enforce strict dis-
cipline and good order among his employees and shall 
not employ on the Work any unfit person or anyone not 
skilled in the task assigned to him. 
4.5 WARRANTY 
4.5.1 The Contractor warrants to the Owner and the 
Architect that all materials and equipment furnished un-
der this Contract will be new unless otherwise specified, 
and that all Work will be of good quality, hee from faults 
and defects and in conformance with the Contract Docu-
ments. All Work not so conforming to these standards 
may be considered defective. If required by the Archi-
tect, the Contractor shall furnish satisfactory evidence 
as to the kind and quality of materials and equipment. 
4.6 TAXES 
4.6.1 The Contractor shall pay all sales, consumer, use 
and other similar taxes required by law. 
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4.7 PERMITS, FEES AND NOTICES 
4.7.1 The Contractor shall secure and pay for all permits, 
governmental fees and licenses necessary for the proper 
execution and completion of the Work, which are appli-
cable at the time the bids are received. It is not the re-
sponsibility of the Contractor to make certain that the 
Drawings and Specifications are in accordance with ap-
plicable laws, statutes, building codes and regulations. 
4.7.2 The Contractor shall give all notices and comply 
with ail laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders 
of any public authority bearing on the performance of 
the Work If the Contractor observes that any of the 
Contract Documents are at variance therewith in any 
respect, he shall promptly notify the Architect in writing, 
and any necessary changes shall be adjusted by appropri-
ate Modification If the Contractor performs any Work 
knowing it to be contrary to such laws, ordinances, rules 
and regulations, and without such notice to the Archi-
tect, he shall assume full responsibility therefor and shall 
bear all costs attributable thereto 
4.8 CASH ALLOWANCES 
4.8.1 The Contractor shall include in the Contract Sum 
ail allowances stated m the Contract Documents These 
allowances shall cover the net cost of the materials and 
equipment delivered and unloaded at the site, and all 
applicable taxes The Contractor's handling costs on the 
site, labor, installation costs, overhead, profit and other 
expenses contemplated for the original allowance shall 
be included in the Contract Sum and not in the allow-
ance The Contractor shall cause the Work covered by 
these allowances to be performed for such amounts and 
by such persons as the Architect may direct, but he will 
not be required to employ persons agamst whom he 
makes a reasonable objection If the cost, when deter-
mined, is more than or less than the allowance, the Con-
tract Sum shall be adjusted accordingly by Change Order 
which will include additional handling costs on the site, 
labor, installation costs, overhead, profit and other ex-
penses resulting to the Contractor from any increase over 
the original allowance 
4.9 SUPERINTENDENT 
4.9.1 The Contractor shall employ a competent super-
intendent and necessary assistants who shall be in at-
tendance at the Project site during the progress of the 
Work The superintendent shall be satisfactory to the 
Architect, and shall not be changed except with the con-
sent of the Architect, unless the superintendent proves 
to be unsatisfactory to the Contractor and ceases to be 
in his employ The superintendent shall represent the 
Contractor and all communications given to the superin-
tendent shall be as binding as if given to the Contractor 
Important communications will be confirmed in writing 
Other communications will be so confirmed on written 
request in each case 
4.10 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE PERFORMING 
THE WORK 
4.10.1 The Contractor shall be responsible to the Owner 
for the acts and omissions of all his employees and all 
Subcontractors, their agents and employees, and all other 
persons performing any of the Work under a contract 
with the Contractor 
4.11 PROGRESS SCHEDULE 
4.11.1 The Contractor, immediately after being awarded 
the Contract, shall prepare and submit for the Architect's 
approva\ an estimated progress schedule for the Work 
The progress schedule shall be related to the entire Proj-
ect to the extent required by the Contract Documents 
This schedule shall indicate the dates for the starting and 
completion of the various stages of construction and 
shall be revised as required by the conditions of the 
Work, subject to the Architect's approval 
4.12 DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS AT THE SITE 
4.12.1 The Contractor shall maintain at the site for the 
Owner one copv of all Drawings, Specifications, Addenda, 
approved Shop Drawings, Change Orders and other Mod-
ifications, in good order and marked to record all changes 
made during construction These shall be available to the 
Architect The Drawings, marked to record all changes 
made during construction, shall be delivered to him for 
the Owner upon completion of the Work 
4.13 SHOP DRAWINGS AND SAMPLES 
4.13.1 Shop Drawings are drawings, diagrams, illustra-
tions, schedules, performance charts, brochures and other 
data which are prepared by the Contractor or any Sub-
contractor, manufacturer, supplier or distributor, and 
which illustrate some portion of the Work. 
4.13.2 Samples are physical examples furnished by the 
Contractor to illustrate materials, equipment or work-
manship, and to establish standards by which the Work 
will be judged. 
4.13.3 The Contractor shall review, stamp with his ap-
proval and submit, with reasonable promptness and in 
orderly sequence so as to cause no delay in the Work 
or in the work of any other contractor, ail Shop Draw-
ings and Samples required by the Contract Documents 
or subsequently by the Architect as covered by Modifica-
tions Shop Drawings and Samples snail be properly 
identified as specified, or as the Architect may require 
At the time of submission the Contractor shall mrorm the 
Architect in writing of any deviation in the Shop Draw-
ings or Samples from the requirements of the Contract 
Documents 
4.13.4 By appiovmg and submitting Shop Drawings and 
Samples, the Contractor thereby represents that he has 
determined and verified all field measurements, field con-
struction enter a, materials, catalog numbers and similar 
data, or will do so, and that he has checked and coordi-
nated each Shop Drawing and Sample with the require-
ments of the Work and of the Contract Documents 
4.13.5 The Aichitect will review and approve Shop 
Drawings and Samples with reasonable promptness so as 
to ran*;* nn riolav hut
 0nly for conformance with the de-
ject and with the information given 
ents The Architect's approval of a 
indicate approval of an assembly 
ions 
shall make any corrections re-
t and shall resubmit the required 
zopies of Shop Drawings or new 
J The Contractor shall direct spe-
8 
AIA DOCUMENT A201 • GENERAL CONDITIONS O 
AIA« • <£> 1970 • THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE O 
n i O N • TWELFTH EDITION • APRIL 1970 ED 
AVENUE, N W WASHINGTON D C 20006 
cific attention in writ ing or on resubmitted Shop Draw-
ings to revisions other than the corrections requested by 
the Architect on previous submissions 
4.13.7 The Architect's approval of Shop Drawings or 
Samples shall not relieve the Contractor of responsibility 
for any deviation from the requirements of the Contract 
Documents unless the Contractor has informed the Archi-
tect in writ ing of such deviation at the time of submis-
sion and the Architect has given writ ten approval to the 
specific deviation, nor shall the Architect's approval re-
lieve the Contractor from responsibility for errors or 
omissions in the Shop Drawings or Samples. 
4.13.8 No portion of the Work requiring a Shop Drawing 
or Sample submission shall be commenced until the 
submission has been approved by the Architect All such 
portions of the Work shall be in accordance with ap-
proved Shop Drawings and Samples 
4.14 USE OF SITE 
4.14.1 The Contractor shall confine operations at the 
site to areas permitted by law, ordinances, permits and 
the Contract Documents and shall not unreasonablv en-
cumber the site with any materials or equipment 
4.15 CUTTING AND PATCHING OF WORK 
4.15.1 The Contractor shall do all cutting, f itt ing or 
patching of his Work that may be required to make its 
several parts fit together properly, and shall not endanger 
any Work by cutting, excavating or otherwise altering the 
Work or any part of it. 
4.16 CLEANING UP 
4.16.1 The Contractor at all times shall keep the prem-
ises free from accumulation of waste materials or rubbish 
caused bv his operations At the complet ion of the Work 
he shall remove all his waste materials and rubbish from 
and about the Project as wel l as all his tools, construc-
tion equipment, machinery and surplus materials, and 
shall clean ail glass surfaces and leave the Work "b room-
clean" or its equivalent, except as otherwise specified 
4.16.2 If the Contractor fails to clean up, the Owner 
may do so and the cost thereof shall be charged to the 
Contractor as provided in Paragraph 3 4 
4.17 COMMUNICATIONS 
4.17.1 The Contractor shall forward all communications 
to the Owner through the Architect. 
4.18 INDEMNIFICATION 
4.18.1 The Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless 
the Owner and the Architect and their agents and em-
ployees from and against all claims, damages, losses and 
expenses including attorneys' fees arising out of or re-
sulting from the performance of the Work, provided that 
any such claim, damage, loss or expense (1) is attributable 
to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury 
to or destruction of tangible property (other than the 
Work itself) including the loss of use resulting there-
f rom, and (2) is caused in whole or in part by any negli-
gent act or omission of the Contractor, any Subcontrac-
tor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by any of 
them or anvone for whose acts any of them may be liable, 
regardless of whether or not it is caused in part by a 
party indemnified hereunder 
4.18.2 In any and all claims against the Owner or the 
Architect or any of their agents or employees by any em-
ployee oi the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone d i -
rectly or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone 
for whose acts any of them may be liable, the indemnif i -
cation obligation under this Paragraph 4 18 shall not be 
l imited in any way by any l imitation on the amount or 
type of damages, compensation or benefits payable bv 
or for the Contractor or any Subcontractor under work-
men's compensation acts, disability benefit acts or other 
employee benefit acts. 
4.18.3 The obligations of the Contractor under this Para-
graph 4 18 shall not extend to the liability of the Archi-
tect, his agents or employees arising out of (1) the prepa-
ration or approval oi maps, drawings, opinions, reports, 
survevs, Change Orders, designs or specifications, or (2j 
the giving of or the failure to give directions or instruc-
tions by the Architect, his agents or employees provided 
such giving or failure to give is the primary cause of the 
injury or damage 
ARTICLE 5 
SUBCONTRACTORS 
5.1 DEFINITION 
5.1.1 A Subcontractor is a person or organization who 
has a direct contract wi th the Contractor to perform any 
of the Work at the site. The term Subcontractor is re-
ferred to throughout the Contract Documents as if singu-
lar in number and masculine in gender and means a 
Subcontractor or his authorized representative. 
5.1.2 A Sub-subcontractor is a person or organization 
who has a direct or indirect contract with a Subcontractor 
to perform any of the Work at the site. The term Sub-
subcontractor is referred to throughout the Contract 
Documents as if singular in number and masculine in 
gender and means a Sub-subcontractor or an authorized 
representative thereof 
5.1.3 Nothing contained in the Contract Documents 
shall create any contractual relation between the Owner 
or the Architect and any Subcontractor or Sub-subcon-
tractor. 
5.2 AWARD OF SUBCONTRACTS AND OTHER 
CONTRACTS FOR PORTIONS OF THE WORK 
5.2.1 Unless otherwise specified in the Contract Docu-
ments or in the Instructions to Bidders, the Contractor, 
as soon as practicable after the award of the Contract, 
shall furnish to the Architect in writ ing for acceptance by 
the Owner and the Architect a list of the names of the 
Subcontractors proposed for the principal portions of the 
Work. The Architect shall promptly notify the Contrac-
tor in wri t ing if either the Owner or the Architect, after 
due investigation, has reasonable objection to any Sub-
contractor on such list and does not accept him Failure 
of the Owner or Architect to make objection promptly to 
any Subcontractor on the list shall constitute acceptance 
of such Subcontractor 
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5.2.2 The Contractor shall not contract wi th any Sub-
contractor or am person or organization (including those 
who are to furnish materials or equipment fabricated to 
a special design) proposed for portions of the Work 
designated in the Contract Documents or in the Instruc-
tions to Bidders or, if none is so designated, wi th an> 
Subcontractor proposed for the principal portions of the 
Work who has been rejected by the Owner and the 
Architect The Contractor wi l l not be required to con-
tract wi th any Subcontractor or person or organization 
against w h o m he has a reasonable objection 
5.2.3 If the Owner or Architect refuses to accept any 
Subcontractor or person or organization on a list sub-
mit ted by the Contractor in response to the requirements 
of the Contract Documents or the Instructions to Bidders, 
the Contractor shall submit an acceptable substitute and 
the Contract Sum shad be increased or decreased by the 
difference in cost occasioned by such substitution and an 
appropriate Change Order shall be issued, however, no 
increase in the Contract Sum shall be al lowed for any 
such substitution unless the Contractor has acted promptly 
and responsively in submitt ing for acceptance any list 
or lists of names as required by the Contract Documents 
or the Instructions to Bidders. 
5.2.4 If the Owner or the Architect requires a change of 
any proposed Subcontractor or person or organization 
previously accepted by them, the Contract Sum shall be 
increased or decreased by the difference in cost occa-
sioned by such change and an appropriate Change Order 
shall be issued 
5.2.5 The Contractor shall not make any substitution for 
any Subcontractor or person or organization who has 
been accepted by the Owner and the Architect, unless 
the substitution is acceptable to the Owner and the 
Architect. 
5.3 SUBCONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
5.3.1 Al l work performed for the Contractor by a Sub-
contractor shall be pursuant to an appropriate agree-
ment between the Contractor and the Subcontractor (and 
where appropriate between Subcontractors and Sub-
subcontractors) which shall contain provisions that* 
.1 preserve and protect the rights of the Owner and 
the Architect under the Contract wi th respect to 
the Work to be performed under the subcontract 
so that the subcontracting thereof wi l l not preju-
dice such rights, 
.2 require that such Work be performed in accord-
ance wi th the requirements of the Contract 
Documents, 
.3 require submission to the Contractor of applica-
tions for payment under each subcontract to 
which the Contractor is a party, in reasonable 
time to enable the Contractor to apply for pay-
ment in accordance w i th Article 9, 
4 require that all claims for additional costs, exten-
sions of t ime, damages for delays or otherwise 
wi th respect to subcontracted portions of the 
Work shall be submitted to the Contractor (via 
any Subcontractor or Sub-subcontractor where 
appropriate) in sufficient t ime so that the Con-
tractor may ccmtnlv r •- j manner provided in 
the Contract DocL-nint or uke claims by the 
Contractor upon tn*» Ov\n«r 
.5 waive all rights the contracting parties may have 
against one another rer damages caused by fire 
or other perils covered b\ the property insurance 
described in Paragraph *M 3 except such rights as 
they may have to the proceeds of such insurance 
held by the Owner as trustee under Paragraph 
11 3, and 
6 obligate each Subcontractor specifically to con-
sent to the provision^ or this Paragraph 5.3 
5.4 PAYMENTS TO SUBCONTRACTORS 
5.4.1 The Contractor shall pay each Subcontractor, upon 
receipt of payment from the Owner an amount equal 
to the percentage ot complet ion allowed to the Con-
tractor on account of such Subcontractor's Work, less the 
percentage retained from pavments to the Contractor 
The Contractor shall also require each Subcontractor to 
make similar payments to his subcontractors. 
5.4.2 If the Architect fails to issue a Certificate for Pay-
ment for any cause which is the fault of the Contractor 
and not the fault of a particular Subcontractor, the Con-
tractor shall pay that Subcontractor on demand, made at 
any time after the Certificate for Payment should other-
wise have been issued, for hi> Work to the extent com-
pleted, less the retained percentage 
5.4.3 The Contractor shall pay each Subcontractor a just 
share of any insurance moness received by the Contractor 
under Article 11, and he shall require each Subcontractor 
to make similar payments to his subcontractors. 
5.4.4 The Architect may, on request and at his discretion, 
furnish to any Subcontractor, if practicable, information 
regarding percentages of comp'enun certified to the Con-
tractor on account of Work done bv such Subcontractors 
5.4.5 Neither the Owner nor the Architect shall have any 
obligation to pay or to see to the pavment of any moneys 
to any Subcontractor except as may otherwise be required 
by law 
ARTICLE 6 
SEPARATE CONTRACTS 
6.1 OWNER'S RICHT TO AWARD SEPARATE CONTRACTS 
6.1.1 The Owner reserves the nght to award other con-
tracts in connection wi th other portions of the Project 
under these or similar Conditions of the Contract. 
6.1.2 When separate contracts are awarded for different 
portions of the Project, " the Contractor" m the contract 
documents in each case shall bo the contractor who signs 
each separate contract 
6.2 MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTRACTORS 
6.2.1 The Contractor shall afiord other contractors rea-
sonable oppoitunity for the introduction and storage of 
their materials and equipment a: ri tne execution of their 
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work, and shall properly connect and coordinate his 
Work with theirs 
6.2.2 If any part of the Contractor's Work depends for 
proper execution or results upon the work of anv other 
separate contractor, the Contractor shall inspect and 
promptly report to the Architect any apparent discrepan-
cies or defects in such work that render it unsuitable for 
such proper execution and results. Failure of the Con-
tractor so to inspect and report shall constitute an accept-
ance of the other contractor's work as fit and proper to 
receive his Work, except as to defects which may develop 
in the other separate contractor's work after the execution 
of the Contractor's Work. 
6.2.3 Should the Contractor cause damage to the work 
or property of anv separate contractor on the Project, the 
Contractor shall, upon due notice, settle with such other 
contractor by agreement or arbitration, if he wi l l so settle. 
If such separate contractor sues the Owner or initiates 
an arbitration proceeding on account of any damage 
alleged to have been so sustained, the Owner shall notify 
the Contractor who shall defend such proceedings at the 
Owner's expense, and if any judgment or award against 
the Owner arises therefrom the Contractor shall pay or 
satisfy it and shall reimburse the Owner for ail attorneys' 
fees and court or arbitration costs which the Owner has 
incurred. 
6.3 CUTTING AND PATCHING 
UNDER SEPARATE CONTRACTS 
6.3.1 The Contractor shall be responsible for any cutt ing, 
f i t t ing and patching that may be required to complete 
his Work except as otherwise specifically provided in the 
Contract Documents. The Contractor shall not endanger 
any work of any other contractors by cutting, excavating 
or otherwise altering any work and shall not cut or alter 
the work of any other contractor except with the wri t ten 
consent of the Architect. 
6.3.2 Any costs caused by defective or i l l-t imed work 
shall be borne by the party responsible therefor. 
6#4 OWNER'S RIGHT TO CLEAN UP 
6.4.1 If a dispute arises between the separate contractors 
as to their responsibility for cleaning up as required by 
Paragraph 4.16, the Owner may clean up and charge the 
cost thereof to the several contractors as the Architect 
shall determine to be just. 
ARTICLE 7 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
7.1 GOVERNING LAW 
7.1.1 The Contract shall be governed by the law of the 
place where the Project is located. 
7.2 SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
7.2.1 The Owner and the Contractor each binds h im-
self, his partners, successors, assigns and legal represen-
tatives to the other party hereto and to the partners, suc-
cessors, assigns and legal representatives of such other 
party in respect to all covenants, agreements and obliga-
tions contained in the Contract Documents. Neither 
party to the Contract shall assign the Contract or sublet it 
as a whole without the wri t ten consent of the other, nor 
shall the Contractor assign any moneys due or to become 
due to him hereunder, wi thout the previous written con-
sent of the Owner 
7.3 WRITTEN NOTICE 
7.3.1 Written notice shall be deemed to have been duly 
served if delivered in person to the individual or member 
of the firm or to an officer of the corporation for whom 
it was intended, or if delivered at or sent by registered 
or certified mail to the last business address known to 
him who gives the notice. 
7.4 CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES 
7.4.1 Should either party to the Contract suffer injury or 
damage to person or property because or any act or 
omission of the other party or of any of his employees, 
agents or others for whose acts he is legally liable, claim 
shall be made in wr i t ing to such other party within a 
reasonable time after the first observance of such injury 
or damage. 
7.5 PERFORMANCE BOND AND 
LABOR AND MATERIAL PAYMENT BOND 
7.5.1 The Owner shall have the right to require the 
Contractor to furnish bonds covering the faithful per-
formance of the Contract and the payment of all obliga-
tions arising thereunder if and as required in the Instruc-
tions to Bidders or elsewhere in the Contract Documents 
7.6 RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
7.6.1 The duties and obligations imposed by the Con-
tract Documents and the rights and remedies available 
thereunder shall be in addit ion to and not a limitation 
of any duties, obligations, rights and remedies otherwise 
imposed or available by law 
7.7 ROYALTIES AND PATENTS 
7.7.1 The Contractor shall pay all royalties and license 
fees. He shall defend all suits or claims for infringement 
of any patent rights and shall save the Owner harmless 
from loss on account thereof, except that the Owner 
shall be responsible for ail such loss when a particular de-
sign, process or the product of a particular manufacturer 
or manufacturers is specified, but if the Contractor has 
reason to believe that the design, process or product 
specified is an infringement of a patent, he shall be re-
sponsible for such loss unless he promptly gives such in-
formation to the Architect. 
7.8 TESTS 
7.8.1 If the Contract Documents, laws, ordinances, rules, 
regulations or orders of any public authority having juris-
diction require any Work to be inspected, tested or ap-
proved, the Contractor shall give the Architect timely no-
tice of its readiness and of the date arranged so the 
Architect may observe such inspection, testing or ap-
proval. The Contractor shall bear ail costs of such inspec-
tions, tests and approvals unless otherwise provided. 
7.8.2 If after the commencement of the Work the 
Architect determines that any Work requires special in-
spection, testing, or approval which Subparagraph 7 8 1 
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does not include, he w i l l , upon writ ten authorization 
f rom the Owner, instruct the Contractor to order such 
special inspection, testing or approval, and the Con-
tractor shall give notice as in Subparagraph 7 8 1 If such 
special inspection or testing reveals a failure of the Work 
to comply (1) wi th the requirements of the Contract 
Documents or (2), w i th respect to the performance of the 
Work , w i th laws, ordinances, rules, regulations or orders 
of any public authority having jur isdict ion, the Contractor 
shall bear all costs thereof, including the Architect's addi-
tional services made necessary by such failure, otherwise 
the Owner shall bear such costs, and an appropriate 
Change Order shall be issued. 
7.8.3 Required certificates of inspection, testing or ap-
proval shall be secured by the Contractor and promptly 
delivered by him to the Architect 
7.8.4 If the Architect wishes to observe the inspections, 
tests or approvals required by this Paragraph 7 8, he wi l l 
do so promptly and, where practicable, at the source of 
supply. 
7.8.5 Neither the observations of the Architect in his 
Administrat ion of the Construction Contract, nor inspec-
tions, tests or approvals by persons other than the Con-
tractor shall relieve the Contractor from his obligations 
to perform the Work in accordance with the Contract 
Documents. 
7.9 INTEREST 
7.9.1 Any moneys not paid when due to either party 
under this Contract shall bear interest at the legal rate in 
force at the place of the Project. 
7.-J0 ARBITRATION 
7.10.1 Al l claims, disputes and other matters in question 
arising out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach 
thereof, except as set forth in Subparagraph 2.2 9 with 
respect to the Architect's decisions on matters relating 
to artistic effect, and except for claims which have been 
waived by the making or acceptance of final payment as 
provided by Subparagraphs 9 7 5 and 9 7 6, shall be de-
cided by arbitration in accordance wi th the Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association then obtaining unless the parties mutually 
agree otherwise This agreement to arbitrate shall be 
specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration 
law. The award rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, 
and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance wi th 
applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
7.10.2 Notice of the demand for arbitration shall be filed 
in wr i t ing wi th the other party to the Contract and wi th 
the American Arbitration Association, and a copy shall 
be fi led with the Archi tect The demand for arbitration 
shall be made wi th in the time limits specified in Sub-
paragraphs 2 2 1 0 and 2.2.11 where applicable, and in 
ail other cases wi th in a reasonable time after the claim, 
dispute or other matter in question has arisen, and in no 
event shall it be made after the date when institution of 
legal or equitable proceedings based on such claim, 
dispute or other matter in question would be barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations 
7.10.3 The Contractor shall carry on the Work and main-
tain the progress schedule during any arbitration pro-
ceedings, unless otherwise agreed by him and the Owner 
in wri t ing. 
ARTICLE 8 
T IME 
8.1 DEFINITIONS 
8.1.1 The Contract Time is the period of time alloted in 
the Contract Documents for completion of the Work. 
8.1.2 The date of commencement of the Work is the 
date established in a notice to proceed If there is no 
notice to proceed, it shall be the date of the Agreement 
or such other date as may be established therein 
8.1.3 The Date of Substantial Completion of the Work 
or designated port ion thereof is the Date certified by the 
Architect when construction is sufficiently complete, in 
accordance with the Contract Documents, so the Owner 
may occupy the Work or designated portion thereof for 
the use for which it is intended. 
8.1.4 The term day as used in the Contract Documents 
shall mean calendar day. 
8.2 PROGRESS AND COMPLETION 
8.2.1 All time limits stated in the Contract Documents 
are of the essence of the Contract 
8.2.2 The Contractor shall begin the Work on the date 
of commencement as defined in Subparagraph 8 1 2 He 
shall carry the Work forward expeditiously with adequate 
forces and shall complete it within the Contract Time. 
8.2.3 If a date or t ime of completion is included in the 
Contract, it shall be the Date of Substantial Completion 
as defined in Subparagraph 8.1.3, including authorized 
extensions thereto, unless otherwise provided. 
8.3 DELAYS AND EXTENSIONS OF TIME 
8.3.1 If the Contractor is delayed at any time in the 
progress of the Work by any act or neglect of the Owner 
or the Architect, or by any employee of either, or by any 
separate contractor employed by the Owner, or by 
changes ordered in the Work, or by labor disputes, fire, 
unusual delay in transportation, unavoidable casualties or 
any causes beyond the Contractor's control, or by delav 
authorized by the Owner pending arbitration, or by any 
cause which the Architect determines may justify the 
delay, then the Contract Time shall be extended by 
Change Order for such reasonable time as the Architect 
may determine. 
8.3.2 All claims for extension of time shall be made in 
wri t ing to the Architect no more than twenty days after 
the occurrence of the delay; otherwise they shall be 
waived. In the case of a continuing cause of delay only 
one claim is necessary 
8.3.3 If no schedule or agreement is made stating the 
dates upon which wri t ten interpretations as set forth in 
Subparagraph 12 5 shall be furnished, then no claim for 
delay shall be allowed on account of failure to furnish 
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such interpretations until •iftrcn OJVS after demand is 
made for them, and not trwi unless such claim is 
reasonable 
8.3,4 This Paragraph 8 3 do*s not exclude the recovery 
of damages for delay by either party under other pro-
visions of the Contract Documents 
ARTICLE 9 
PAYMENTS A N D C O M P L E T I O N 
9.1 CONTRACT SUM 
9.1.1 The Contract Sum is stated in the Agreement and 
is the total amount payable by the Owner to the Con-
tractor for the performance of the Work under the 
Contract Documents 
9.2 SCHEDULE OF VALUES 
9.2.1 Betore the first Application for Payment, the Con-
tractor shall submit to the Architect a schedule of values 
of the various portions of the Work, including quantities 
if required by the Architect, aggregating the total Con-
tract Sum, divided so as to facilitate payments to Sub-
contractors in accordance with Paragraph 5 4, prepared in 
such form as specified or as the Architect and the Con-
tractor may agree upon, and supported by such data to 
substantiate its correctness as the Architect may require. 
Each item in the schedule of values shall include its 
proper share of overhead and profit This schedule, when 
approved by the Architect, shall be used only as a basis 
for the Contractor's Applications for Payment 
9.3 PROGRESS PAYMENTS 
9.3.1 At least ten days before each progress payment 
falls due, the Contractor shall submit to the Architect an 
itemized Application for Payment, supported by such 
data substantiating the Contractor's right to payment as 
the Owner or the Architect may require 
9.3.2 If payments are to be made on account of mate-
rials or equipment not incorporated in the Work but de 
livered and suitably stored at the site, or at some other 
location agreed upon in writing, such payments shall be 
conditioned upon submission by the Contractor of bills 
of sale or such other procedures satisfactory to the 
Owner to establish the Owner's title^to such materials or 
equipment or otherwise protect the Owner's interest in-
cluding applicable insurance and transportation to the 
site 
9'.3.3 The Contractor warrants and guarantees that title 
to all Work, materials and equipment covered by an 
Application for Payment, whether incorporated in the 
Project or not, will pass to the Owner upon the receipt 
of such payment by the Contractor, free and clear of 
ail hens, claims, security interests or encumbrances, here-
inafter referred to in this Article 9 as "liens", and that no 
Work, materials or equipment covered by an Application 
for Payment will have been acquired by the Contractor, 
or by any other person performing the Work at the site 
or furnishing materials and equipment for the Project, 
subject to an agreement under which an interest therein 
or an encumbrance thereon is retained by the seller or 
otherwise imposed by the Contractor or such other 
person 
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9.4 CERTIFICATES FOR PAYMENT 
9.4.1 If the Contractor has made Application for Pay-
ment as above, the Architect will, with reasonable 
promptness but not more than seven days after the re-
ceipt of the Application, issue a Certificate for Payment 
to the Owner, with a copy to the Contractor, for such 
amount as he determines to be properly due, or state in 
writing his reasons for withholding a Certificate as pro-
vided in Subparagraph 9 5 1 
9.4.2 The issuance of a Certificate for Payment will con-
stitute a representation by the Architect to the Owner, 
based on his observations at the site as provided in Sub-
paragraph 2 2 4 and the data comprising the Applica-
tion for Payment, that the Work has progressed to the 
point indicated, that to the best of his knowledge, in-
formation and belief the quality of the Work is m ac 
cordance with the Contract Documents (subject to an 
evaluation of the Work for conformance with the Con-
tract Documents upon Substantial Completion, to the 
results of any subsequent tests required by the Contract 
Documents, to minor deviations from the Contract Docu-
ments correctable prior to completion, and to any spe-
cific qualifications stated in his Certificate), and that the 
Contractor is entitled to payment in the amount certified 
In addition, the Architect's final Certificate for Payment 
will constitute a further representation that the condi-
tions precedent to the Contractor's being entitled to final 
payment as set forth in Subparagraph 9 7 2 have been 
fulfilled However, by issuing a Certificate for Payment, 
the Architect shall not thereby be deemed to represent 
that he has made exhaustive or continuous on-site 
inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work 
or that he has reviewed the construction means, methods, 
techniques, sequences or procedures, or that he has 
made any examination to ascertain how or for what 
purpose the Contractor has used the moneys previously 
paid on account of the Contract Sum 
9.4.3 After the Architect has issued a Certificate for Pay-
ment, the Owner shall make payment in the manner pro-
vided in the Agreement 
9.4.4 No certificate for a progress payment, nor any 
progress payment, nor any partial or entire use or oc-
cupancy of the Project by the Owner, shall constitute an 
acceptance of any Work not in accordance with the Con-
tract Documents 
9.5 PAYMENTS WITHHELD 
9.5.1 The Architect may decline to approve an Appli-
cation for Payment and may withhold his Certificate in 
whole or in part, to the extent necessary reasonably to 
protect the Owner, if in his opinion he is unable to make 
representations to the Owner as provided in Subpara-
graph 9 4 2 The Architect may also decline to approve 
any Applications for Payment or, because of subsequently 
discovered evidence or subsequent inspections, he may 
nullify the whole or any part of any Certificate for Pay-
ment previously issued, to such extent as may be neces-
sary in his opinion to protect the Owner from loss be-
cause of 
.1 defective work not remedied, 
.2 third party claims tiled or reasonable evidence 
indicating probable filing of such claims, 
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.3 failure of the Contractor to make payments prop-
erly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or 
equipment, 
,4 reasonable doubt that the Work can be com-
pleted for the unpaid balance of the Contract 
Sum, 
3 damage to another contractor, 
•6 reasonable indication that the Work will not be 
completed within the Contract Time, or 
.7 unsatisfactory prosecution of the Work by the 
Contractor 
9.5.2 When the above grounds in Subparagraph 9 5 1 
are removed, payment shall be made for amounts with-
held because of them. 
9.6 FAILURE OF PAYMENT 
9.6.1 If the Architect should fail to issue any Certificate 
for Payment, through no fault of the Contractor, within 
seven days after receipt of the Contractor's Application 
for Payment, or if the Owner should fail to pay the Con-
tractor within seven days after the date of payment es-
tablished in the Agreement any amount certified bv the 
Architect or awarded by arbitration, then the Contrac-
tor may, upon seven additional days' written notice to 
the Owner and the Architect, stop the Work until pay-
ment of the amount owing has been received. 
9.7 SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION ANO FINAL PAYMENT 
9.7.1 When the Contractor determines that the Work 
or a designated portion thereof acceptable to the Owner 
is substantially complete, the Contractor shall prepare tor 
submission to the Architect a list of items to be com-
pleted or corrected. The failure to include any items 
on such list does not alter the responsibility of the Con-
tractor to complete all Work in accordance with the 
Contract Documents When the Architect on the basis or 
an inspection determines that the Work is substantially 
complete, he will then prepare a Certificate of Substantial 
Completion which shall establish the Date of Substantial 
Completion, shall state the responsibilities of the Owner 
and the Contractor for maintenance, heat, utilities, and 
insurance, and shall fix the time within which the Con-
tractor shall complete the items listed therein The Cer-
tificate of Substantial Completion shall be submitted to 
the Owner and the Contractor for their written accept 
ance of the responsibilities assigned to them in such 
Certificate 
9.7.2 Upon receipt of written notice that the Work is 
ready for final inspection and acceptance and upon re-
ceipt of a final Application for Payment, the Architect 
will promptly make such inspection and, when he finds 
the Work acceptable under the Contract Documents and 
the Contract fully performed, he will promptly issue a 
final Certificate for Payment stating that to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief, and on the basis of 
his observations and inspections, the Work has been 
completed in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the Contract Documents and that the entire balance 
found to be due the Contractor, and noted in said final 
Certificate,^ due and payable 
9.7.3 Neither the final payment nor the remaining re-
tained percentage shall become due until the Contractor 
submits to the Architect (1) an Affidavit that all payrolls, 
bills for materials and equipment, and other indebtedness 
connected with the Work for which the Owner or his 
property might in any way be responsible, have been 
paid or otherwise satisfied, (2) consent of surety, if any, 
to final payment and (3), if required by the Owner, other 
data establishing payment or satisfaction of ail such ob-
ligations, such as receipts, releases and waivers of liens 
arising out of the Contract, to the extent and in such form 
as may be designated by the Owner If any Subcontrac-
tor refuses to furnish a release or waiver required by the 
Owner, the Contractor may furnish a bond satisfactory to 
the Owner to indemnify him against any such hen If 
any such hen remains unsatisfied after all payments are 
made, the Contractor shall refund to the Owner all 
moneys that the latter may be compelled to pay in dis-
charging such hen, including all costs and reasonable at-
torneys' fees. 
9.7.4 If after Substantial Completion of the Work final 
completion thereof is materially delayed through no fault 
of the Contractor, and the Architect so confirms, the 
Owner shall, upon certification by the Architect, and with-
out terminating the Contract, make payment of the bal-
ance due for that portion of the Work fully completed 
and accepted If the remaining balance for Work not fully 
completed or corrected is less than the retamage stipu-
lated in the Agreement, and if bonds have been furnished 
as required in Subparagraph 7.5 1, the written consent of 
the surety to the payment of the balance due for that 
portion of the Work fully completed and accepted shall 
be submitted by the Contractor to the Architect prior to 
certification of such payment Such payment shall be 
made under the terms and conditions governing final 
payment, except that it shall not constitute a waiver of 
claims 
9.7.5 The making of final payment shall constitute a 
waiver of all claims by the Owner except those arising 
from 
.1 unsettled hens, 
.2 faulty or defective Work appearing after Substan-
tial Completion, 
.3 failure of the Work to comply with the require-
ments of the Contract Documents, or 
.4 terms of any special guarantees required by the 
Contract Documents 
9.7.6 The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a 
waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those pre-
viously made in writing and still unsettled 
ARTICLE 10 
PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
10.1 SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND PROGRAMS 
10,1.1 The Contractor shall be responsible for initiating, 
maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and 
programs in connection with the Work 
10.2 SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY 
10.2.1 The Contractor shall take all reasonable precau-
tions for the safety of, and shall provide all reasonable 
protection to prevent damage, injury or loss to 
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.1 all employees on the Work and alt other per-
sons who may be affected thereby, 
.2 all the Work and all materials and equipment 
to be incorporated therein, whether in storage 
on or off the site, under the care, custody or 
control of the Contractor or any of his Sub-
contractors or Sub-subcontractors, and 
.3 other property at the site or adjacent thereto, 
including trees, shrubs, lawns, walks, pavements, 
roadways, structures and utilities not designated 
for removal, relocation or replacement in the 
course of construction 
10.2.2 The Contractor shall comply with ail applicable 
laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and lawful orders of 
any public authority having jurisdiction for the safety 
of persons or property or to protect them from damage, 
injury or loss He shall erect and maintain, as required 
by existing conditions and progress of the Work, all 
reasonable safeguards for safety and protection, includ-
ing posting danger signs and other warnings against haz-
ards, promulgating safety regulations and notifying owners 
and users of adjacent utilities 
10.2.3 When the use or storage of explosives or other 
hazardous materials or equipment is necessary for the 
execution of the Work, the Contractor shall exercise 
the utmost care and shall carry on such activities under 
the supervision of properly qualified personnel 
10.2.4 All damage or loss to any property referred to in 
Clauses 1021 2 and 1021 3 caused in whole or in part 
by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, any Sub-subcon-
tractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed by any 
of them, or by anyone for whose acts any of them may 
be liable shall be remedied by the Contractor, except 
damage or loss attributable to faulty Drawings or Specifi-
cations or to the acts or omissions of the Owner or Archi-
tect or anyone employed by either of them or for whose 
acts either of them may be liable, and not attributable to 
the fault or negligence of the Contractor 
10.2.5 The Contractor shall designate a responsible 
member of his organization at the site whose duty shall 
be the prevention of accidents This person shall be the 
Contractors superintendent unless otherwise designated 
in writing by the Contractor to the Owner and the 
Architect 
10.2.6 The Contractor shall not load or permit any part 
of the Work to be loaded so as to endanger its safety 
1 0 . 3 EMERGENCIES 
10.3.1 In any emergency affecting the safety of persons 
or property, the Contractor shall act, at his discretion, 
to prevent threatened damage, injury or loss. Any addi 
tional compensation or extension of time claimed by the 
Contractor on account of emergency work shall be de-
termined as provided in Article 12 for Changes in the 
Work 
ARTICLE 11 
INSURANCE 
11.1 CONTRACTOR'S UA8IUTY INSURANCE 
11.1.1 The Contractor shall purchase and maintain such 
insurance as will protect him from claims set forth below 
which may arise out of or result from the Contractor's 
operations under the Contract, whether such operations 
be by himself or by any Subcontractor or by anyone di-
rectly or indirectly employed by any of them, or by any-
one for whose acts any of them may be liable 
.1 claims under workmen s compensation, disability 
benefit and other similar employee benefit acts, 
.2 claims for damages because of bodily injury, 
occupational sickness or disease, or death of his 
employees, 
3 claims for damages because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, or death of any person other 
than his employees, 
.4 claims for damages insured by usual personal 
injury liability coverage which are sustained (1) 
by any person as a result of an offense directly or 
indirectly related to the employment of such 
person by the Contractor, or (2) by any other 
person, and 
.5 claims for damages because of injury to or de-
struction of tangible propertv, including loss of 
use resulting therefrom 
11.1.2 The insurance required by Subparagraph 1111 
shall be written for not less than any limits of liability 
specified in the Contract Oocuments, or required by law, 
whichever is greater, and shall include contractual liability 
insurance as applicable to the Contractor's obligations 
under Paragraph 418 
11.1.3 Certificates of Insurance acceptable to the Owner 
shall be filed with the Owner prior to commencement of 
the Work These Certificates shall contain a provision that 
coverages afforded under the policies will not be can-
celled until at least fifteen days' prior written notice has 
been given to the Owner 
11.2 OWNER'S LIABILITY INSURANCE 
11.2.1 The Owner shall be responsible for purchasing 
and maintaining his own liability insurance and at his 
option,may purchase and maintain such insurance as will 
protect him against claims which may arise from opera 
tions under the Contract 
11J PROPERTY INSURANCE 
113.1 Unless otherwise provided the Owner shall pur 
chase and maintain property insurance upon the entire 
Work at the site to the full insurable value thereof This 
insurance shall include the interests of the Owner, the 
Contractor, Subcontractors and Sub-subcontractors in the 
Work and shall insure against the penis of Fire, Extended 
Coverage, Vandalism and Malicious Mischief 
11.3.2 The Owner shall purchase and maintain sucn 
steam boiler and machinery insurance as may be required 
by the Contract Documents or by law This insurance 
shall include the interests of the Owner, the Contractor 
Subcontractors and Sub-subcontractors in the Work 
113.3 Any insured loss is to be adjusted with the Owner 
and made payable to the Owner as trustee for the in 
sureds, as their interests may appear, subject to the re 
quirements of any applicable mortgagee clause and o 
Subparagraph 113 8 
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11.3.4 The Owner shall file a copy of all policies wi th 
the Contractor before an exposure to loss may occur. If 
the Owner does not intend to purchase such insurance 
he shall inform the Contractor in wri t ing prior to com-
mencement of the Work. The Contractor may then effect 
insurance which w i l l protect the interests of himself, his 
Subcontractors and the Sub-subcontractors in the Work, 
and by appropriate Change Order the cost thereof shall 
be charged to the Owner If the Contractor is damaged by 
failure of the Owner to purchase or maintain such insur-
ance and so to notify the Contractor, then the Owner 
shall bear all reasonable costs properly attributable 
thereto. 
11.3.5 11 the Contractor requests in writ ing that insur-
ance for special hazards be included in the property insur-
ance policy, the Owner shall, if possible, include such 
insurance, and the cost thereof shall be charged to the 
Contractor by appropriate Change Order 
11.3.6 The Owner and Contractor waive all rights against 
each other for damages caused by fire or other perils to 
the extent covered by insurance provided under this Para-
graph 1 1 3 , except such rights as they may have to the 
proceeds of such insurance held by the Owner as trustee. 
The Contractor shall require similar waivers by Subcon 
tractors and Sub-subcontractors in accordance wi th 
Clause 5.3.1.5. 
11.3.7 If required in wri t ing by any party in interest, the 
Owner as trustee shall, upon the occurrence of an insured 
loss, give bond for the proper performance of his duties. 
He shall deposit in a separate account any money so re-
ceived, and he shall distribute it in accordance with such 
agreement as the parties in interest may reach, or in ac-
cordance wi th an award by arbitration in which case the 
procedure shall be as provided in Paragraph 7 10 It after 
such loss no other special agreement is made, replace-
ment of damaged work shall be covered by an appro-
priate Change Order 
11.3.8 The Owner as trustee shall have power to adjust 
and settle any loss wi th the insurers unless one of the 
parties in interest shall object in writ ing within five days 
after the occurrence of loss to the Owner's exercise of 
this power, and if such objection be made, arbitrators 
shall be chosen as provided in Paragraph 7 10 The Owner 
as trustee shall, in that case, make settlement with the 
insurers in accordance with the directions of such arbi-
trators. If distr ibution of the insurance proceeds by 
arbitration is required, the arbitrators wil l direct such 
distr ibut ion. 
1 -1.4 LOSS OF USE INSURANCE 
11.4.1 The Owner, at his opt ion, may purchase and 
maintain such insurance as wi l l insure him against loss of 
use of his property due to fire or other hazards, however 
caused 
ARTICLE 12 
CHANGES IN THE W O R K 
12.1 CHANGE ORDERS 
12.1.1 The Owner wi thout invalidating the Contract, 
may order Changes in the Work within the general scope 
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of the Contract consisting of additions, deletions or other 
revisions, the Contract Sum and the Contract Time being 
adjusted accordingly. All such Changes in the Work shall 
be authorized by Change Order, and shall be executed 
under the applicable conditions of the Contract Docu-
ments. 
12.1.2 A Change Order is a written order to the Con-
tractor signed by the Owner and the Architect, issued 
after the execution of the Contract, authorizing a Change 
in the Work or an adjustment in the Contract Sum or the 
Contract Time. Alternatively, the Change Order may be 
signed by the Architect alone, provided he has written 
authority from the Owner for such procedure and that a 
copy of such wri t ten authority is furnished to the Con-
tractor upon request. A Change Order may also be signed 
by the Contractor if he agrees to the adjustment in the 
Contract Sum or the Contract Time The Contract Sum 
and the Contract Time may be changed only by Change 
Order 
12.1.3 The cost or credit to the Owner resulting from a 
Change in the Work shall be determined in one or more 
of the fo l lowing ways* 
.1 bv mutual acceptance of a lump sum properly 
i temized, 
.2 by unit prices stated in the Contract Documents 
or subsequently agreed upon; or 
•3 by cost and a mutually acceptable fixed or per-
centage fee. 
12.1.4 If none of the methods set forth in Subparagraph 
12.1.3 is agreed upon, the Contractor, provided he re-
ceives a Change Order, shall promptly proceed with the 
Work involved The cost of such Work shall then be de-
termined by the Architect on the basis of the Contractor's 
reasonable expenditures and savings, including, in the 
case of an increase in the Contract Sum, a reasonable 
allowance for overhead and profit. In such case, and also 
under Clause 12.1 3.3 above, the Contractor shall keep 
and present, in such form as the Architect may prescribe, 
an itemized accounting together with appropriate sup-
porting data. Pending final determination of cost to the 
Owner, pavments on account shall be made on the 
Architect's Certificate for Pavment. The amount of credit 
to be allowed by the Contractor to the Owner for any 
deletion or change which results in a net decrease in cost 
wi l l be the amount of the actual net decrease as con-
firmed by the Architect When both additions and credits 
are involved in any one change, the allowance for over-
head and profit shall be figured on the basis of net in-
crease, if any 
12.1.5 If unit prices are stated in the Contract Docu-
ments or subsequently agreed upon, and if the quantities 
originally contemplated are so changed in a proposed 
Change Order that application of the agreed unit prices 
to the quantities of Work proposed will create a hard-
ship on the Owner or the Contractor, the applicable unit 
prices shall be equitably adjusted to prevent such hard-
ship 
12.1.6 Should concealed conditions encountered in the 
performance of the Work below the surface of the ground 
be at variance wi th the conditions indicated by the Con-
tract Documents or should unknown physical conditions 
belov\ the surtace ot the ground of an unusual nature 
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differing materially from i h m r ordinarily encountered and 
generally recogni/cd JS ^ ^ » m ( in \sntK of thi» < harjcter 
provided for in (his ( ' U P C M I ! frw c n i o u n j c i ' d . tho (!on-
tract Sum shall be cqu iuhU .uijustcd In Lii.invic Order 
upon claim by either p j / t \ m j d c within twrntv days 
after the first observance of the conditions 
12.1.7 If the Contractor claims that additional cost is 
involved because of (1) any written interpretation issued 
pursuant to SubparaKraph 1.2.5. (2) any order by the 
Owner to stop the Work pursuant to Paragraph 3.3 where 
the Contractor was not at fault, or (3) any written order 
for a minor change in the Work issued pursuant to Para-
graph 12.3, the Contractor shall make such claim as pro-
vided in Paragraph 12.2. 
12.2 CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COST 
12.2.1 If the Contractor wishes to make a claim for an 
increase in the Contract Sum, he shall give the Architect 
written notice thereof within twenty days after the occur-
rence of the event giving rise to such claim. This notice 
shall be given by the Contractor before proceeding to exe-
cute the Work, except in an emergency endangering life 
or property in which case the Contractor shall proceed in 
accordance with Subparagraph 10.3.1. No such claim shall 
be valid unless so made. If the Owner and the Contractor 
cannot agree on the amount of the adjustment in the 
Contract Sum, it shall be determined by the Architect. 
Any change in the Contract Sum resulting from such 
claim shall be authorized by Change Order. 
12.3 MINOR CHANGES IN THE WORK 
12.3.1 The Architect shall have authority to order minor 
changes in the Work not involving an adjustment in the 
Contract Sum or an extension of the Contract Time and 
not inconsistent with the intent of the Contract Docu-
ments. Such changes may be effected by Field Order or 
by other written order. Such changes shall be binding on 
the Owner and the Contractor. 
12.4 FIELD ORDERS 
12.4.1 The Architect may issue writ ten Field Orders 
which interpret the Contract Documents in accordance 
wi th Subparagraph 1.2.5 or which order minor changes 
in the Work in accordance with Paragraph 12.3 wi thout 
change in Contract Sum or Contract Time. The Contractor 
shall carry out such Field Orders promptly. 
ARTICLE 13 
UNCOVERING A N D CORRECTION OF W O R K 
13.1 UNCOVERING OF WORK 
13.1.1 If any Work should be covered contrary to the re-
quest of the Architect, it must, if required by the Archi-
tect, be uncovered for his observation and replaced, at 
the Contractor's expense. 
13.1.2 If any other Work has been covered which the 
Architect has not specifically requested to observe prior 
to being covered, the Architect may request to see such 
Work and it shall be uncovered by the Contractor. If 
such Work be found in accordance wi th the Contract 
Documents, the cost of uncovering and replacement 
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shall, by appropriate Change Order, be charged to the 
Owner. If such Work be round not in accordance with 
(he Contract Documents, the Contractor shall pay such 
costs unless it be found that this condition was caused 
by a separate contractor employed as provided in Article 
6. and in that event the Owner shall be responsible for 
the payment of such costs. 
13.2 CORRECTION OF WORK 
13.2.1 The Contractor shall promptly correct all Work 
rejected by the Architect as defective or as failing to con-
form to the Contract Documents whether observed 
before or after Substantial Completion and whether or 
not fabricated, installed or completed. The Contractor 
shall bear all cost of correcting such rejected Work, in-
cluding the cost of the Architect's additional services 
thereby made necessary. 
13.2.2 If, within one year after the Date of Substantial 
Completion or within such longer period of time as may 
be prescribed by law or bv the terms of any applicable 
special guarantee required bv the Contract Documents, 
any oi the Work is found to be defective or not in ac-
cordance with the Contract Documents, the Contractor 
shall correct it promptly after receipt of a written notice 
from the Owner to do so unless the Owner has pre-
viously given the Contractor a written acceptance of such 
condit ion. The Owner shall give such notice promptly 
after discovery of the condit ion. 
13.2.3 All such defective or non-conforming Work under 
Subparagraphs 13.2.1 and 13.2.2 shall be removed from 
the site if necessary, and the Work shall be corrected to 
comply with the Contract Documents without cost to 
the Owner. 
13.2.4 The Contractor shall bear the cost of making 
good all work of separate contractors destroyed or dam-
aged by such removal or correction. 
13.2.5 If the Contractor dees not remove such defective 
or non-conforming Work within a reasonable time fixed 
by written notice from the Architect, the Owner may 
remove it and may store the materials or equipment at 
the expense of the Contractor. If the Contractor does not 
pav the cost of such removal and storage within ten days 
thereafter, the Owner may upon ten additional days' 
writ ten notice sell such Work at auction or at private sale 
and shall account for the net proceeds thereof, after 
deducting ail the costs that should have been borne by 
the Contractor including compensation for additional 
architectural services. If such proceeds of sale do not 
cover all costs which the Contractor should have borne, 
the difference shall be charged to the Contractor and an 
appropriate Change Order shall be issued. If the pay-
ments then or thereafter due the Contractor are not suf-
ficient to cover such amount, the Contractor shall pay the 
difference to the Owner. 
13.2.6 If the Contractor fails to correct such defective 
or non-conforming Work, the Owner may correct it in 
accordance with Paragraph 3.4. 
13.3 ACCEPTANCE OF DEFECTIVE 
OR NON-CONFORMING WORK 
13.3.1 If the Owner prefers to accept defective or non-
conforming Work, he may do so instead of requiring its 
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removal and correction, in which case a Change Order 
wi l l be issued to reflect an appropriate reduction in the 
Contract Sum, or, if the amount is determined after final 
payment, it shall be paid by the Contractor 
ARTICLE 14 
TERMINATJON O F THE C O N T R A C T 
14.1 TERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTOR 
14.1.1 If the Work is stopped for a period of thirty 
days under an order oi any court or other public authority 
having jurisdict ion, or as a result of an act of government, 
such as a declaration of a national emergency making 
materials unavailable, through no act or fault of the Con-
tractor or a Subcontractor or their agents or emplovees 
or any other persons performing any of the Work under 
a contract wi th the Contractor, or if the Work should be 
stopped for a period of thirty days by the Contractor for 
the Architect's failure to issue a Certificate for Payment as 
provided in Paragraph 9 6 or for the Owner's failure to 
make payment thereon as provided in Paragraph 9 6, 
then the Contractor may, upon seven days' wri t ten notice 
to the Owner and the Architect, terminate the Contract 
and recover from the Owner payment for all Work exe-
cuted and for any proven loss sustained upon any ma-
terials, equipment, tools, construction equipment and 
machinery, including reasonable profit and damages 
14.2 TERMINATION BY THE OWNER 
14.2.1 If the Contractor is adjudged a bankrupt, or if he 
makes a general assignment for the benefit of his credi-
tors, or if a receiver is appointed on account of his in -
solvency, or if he persistently or repeatedly refuses or 
fails, except in cases for which extension of time is pro-
vided, to supply enough properly skilled workmen or 
proper materials, or if he fails to make prompt payment 
to Subcontractors or for materials or labor, or persistently 
disregards laws, ordinances, rules, regulations or orders 
of any public authority having jurisdiction, or otherwise 
is guilty of a substantial violation of a provision of the 
Contract Documents, then the Owner, upon certification 
by the Architect that sumcient cause exists to justify such 
action, may, wi thout prejudice to any right or remedy 
and after giving the Contractor and his surety, if any, 
seven days written notice, terminate the employment of 
the Contractor and take possession of the site and of 
ail materials, equipment, tools construction equipment 
and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may 
finish the Work by whatever method he may deem ex-
pedient In such case the Contractor shall not be enti t led 
to receive any further payment until the Work is finished 
14.2.2 If the unpaid balance of the Contract Sum ex-
ceeds the cosis of finishing the Work, including com-
pensation for the Architect s additional services, such 
excess shall be paid to the Contractor If such costs ex 
ceed such unpaid balance, the Contractor shall pay the 
difference to the Owner. The costs incurred by the Owner 
as herein provided shall be certified by the Architect 
18 
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ADDENDUM VI 
SWIMMING POOL SPECS, LITTLE AMERICA, 
JOB NO. 22102 
A49 
SWIMMING POOL 
Section 13850 
jflFT 1 - GENERAL 
1#1 Conditions: Division 0 and Division 1 apply to the work 
of this Section. 
1,2 Principal Work In This Section 
a. Coordinate all work in this Section with related trades. 
b. Verify all dimensions at the jobsite. 
c. Swimming pool complete with all equipment and systems. 
in operating condition. 
d. Engineering design of gunite inner shell and reinforc-
ing. 
e. Engineering and installation of mechanical, plumbing, 
and electrical systems from points of connection and 
supply in the swimming pool equipment room. 
f« Piping, conduit and wiring. 
g. Maintenance equipment. 
h. Vibration and sound isolation. 
i. Permits, inspections, tests and fees. 
1#
^ Belated Work In Other Sections 
a. Poured-in-place structural concrete beneath pneumatic-
ally-placed concrete swimming pool shell. 
b. Membrane waterproofing beneath pneumatically-placed 
concrete swimming pool shell. 
c
- Final connections to plumbing supply and waste lines. 
d. Pinal connections to electrical power supply. 
e
« Ceramic tile, plastering and painting, other than 
that required for swimming pool. 
^ Whirlpool and equipment. 
S. Heat exchanger. 
l A S n LITTLE AMERICA, SALT LAKE 
JOB NO. 22102 P.p.M^Tf 
SWIMMING POOL 
Section 13850 
j^ Drawings and Permits 
* Design construct and install the swimming pool and 
Sd "nifl™Pluming Code in tne basic configuration . 
and with the features shown on the drawings. 
b. Secure and pay fees for required permits, inspections 
and tests of the governing agencies. 
1.5 Shop Drawings 
a. Submit shop drawings bearing the approval stamp of 
all governing agencies to the Architect for review. 
b Show eauipment room layouts, piping and conduit sizes 
and routings and electrical wiring diagrams. 
1.6 Tests and Inspections 
a. Test supply lines under at least 35 psi pressure; waste 
lines may be tested at 10 psi. 
b. Test the swimming pool equipment under full °P«^ i o n a l 
conditions. Correct excessive noise and vibration 
from the equipment. 
= • M E m n^ance SWSSJETSS ^ ^ S ^ 
d. Furnish duplicate copies of operation and maintenance 
brochures to the Architect. 
1-7 Definition 
a. 1 ^ (Pneumatically placed ^ ^ \ ^ ^ ^ e 
If norland cement and sand that has been thoroughly 
mLeTfryf pasTed thru a cement gun and conveyecb,^axr 
thru a flexible tube, grated at a nozzle a^^ne 
of the flexible tube and deposited by air pressure 1 
its place of final repose. 
E&g£_2 - PRODUCTS 
2
*1 Gunite and Finish Materials 
a. Portland cement: ASTM C150, Type 1; white for plaster. 
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b. Fine aggregate: ASTM C33* 
c. Water: Clean and potable. 
d. Reinforcing: ASTM A6l5, grade 40. 
e. Welded wire fabric: ASTM Al85; fabricated of not 
lighter than 14 gage wires formed into a 2" x 2" 
mesh. 
f. Plaster sand: Landon Opalyte. 
g. Ceramic tile: In accordance with Section 09310* 
6" x 6" glazed tile in any of the special colors from 
"Interpace. " 
h. Depth markers: Ceramic tile, as above, fired with 
white letter and numbers. Size of tile 6" x 6"; size 
of letters and numbers per code. 
i. Expansion joint: Sealant in accordance with Section 
07900 and tan colored plastic top by "Paddock." 
j. Coping: 12" wide, cast stone with travertine finish 
in special color selected by Architect. 
Plumbing; Materials 
a. Conform to Plumbing Section of Division 15 and as 
follows: 
b. Piping: Type L copper. 
c. Fittings: Copper or brass. 
d. Valves: Brass. 
Electrical Materials 
a. Conform to Division 16, "Electrical" and as follows: 
t>. Conduit imbedded in concrete: Brass. 
c# Fittings for 2.3b above: Brass. 
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Equipment and Accessories 
a. Products specified hereafter are manufactured by 
Swimquip to establish a standard of quality. Com-
parable products by Swimrite or Purex are acceptable. 
b. Mechanical Equipment: 
QTY. CAT. NO. DESCRIPTION 
1. 29323-106 H-3/F 106 pressure diatomaceous earth 
filter w/3 face piping as cataloged. 
1 29607 12" x 18" open top precoat tank 
1 21404-2 Model #1398 slurry/chlorine feed 
package, consisting of two 53 gallon 
solution tanks, dual head feeder 
pump(110V, 1 phase) and slurry 
agitator. 
1 16903-448 5 HP flooded suction pump, model 
#2050-1. 2" x 2-1/2", cast iron, 
bronze fitted w/packing gland. 3 
phase, 60 cycle, 3500 RPM 230/460 
volt. Capacity: 160 GPM @ 75 ft 
TDH. 
1 13801-325 3" IPS pump strainer 
1 14550-13 3" model #F-300 flow meter. 
4 8650 U-3 surface extended throat skimmer 
w/2" connections. 
4 8655-4 2" check valve for above. 
4 8429-1 2" skimmer equalizer fitting for 
above. 
6 8428 1-1/4" cycolac eyeball inlet fitting. 
2 8062 1-1/2" CPB vacuum wall outlet. 
2 7120 12 x 12 CPB frame & grate 
1 8741 1-1/2" stainless steel fillspout. 
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Deck Equipment: 
QTY, CAT NO, DESCRIPTION 
1 2624-34 Coronado diving stand w/stainless 
steel handrails. 
12 foot aluminum diving board. 
3 tread ladder with anchors. 
48" S.S. handrail for shallow end steps. 
Wedge anchor for above. 
S.S. escutcheon plate for above* 
Chrome plated brass cup anchor. 
3/4" safety line hooks. 
3/4" safety line rope* 
5" x 9" safety line floats, 
ant: 
vacuum cleaner head. 
1-1/2" x 24 ft. handle. 
1-1/2" x 40 foot vacuum hose. 
1-1/2" hose to wall connector. 
1-1/4" x 16 foot handle. 
18" wall brush. 
Leaf skimmer. 
1-1/4" x 16 foot handle. 
Taylor test kit. 
Electrical Equipment: 
8 5072-51 500W underwater light with 50 ft. cord. 
4 5068-12 S.S. light niche. 
4 5070-123 3A" junction box. 
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PAET 3 - EXECUTION 
3.I General 
a. In general, perform the various parts of the work of 
this Section in conformance with the requirements of 
these Specifications as follows: 
(1) Reinforcing, Section 03200 
(2) Ceramic Tile, Section 09310 
(3) Plumbing, Division 15 
(4) Electrical, Division 16 
b. Provide the filtering system with the necessary piping, 
valves and fittings complete from inlet to outlet. 
Arrange the piping to carry out filtering, recirculat-
ing and drainage operations and to provide adequate 
and efficient operation of the vacuum cleaner. 
c. Construct pipe lines of full length sections, straight 
and true. Do not spring or force piping into place. 
Do not bend piping. 
d. Seat flange fittings with ring or full face neoprene 
gaskets. 
e. Cap or plug pipe ends and holes to exclude dirt. 
f. Furnish fittings, inserts, sleeves and equipment housing 
together with approved setting drawings to the concrete 
contractor in ample time for setting in the form work. 
3«2 Gunite 
a. Proportions: Not less than 1 part cement to 4-1/2 
parts dry loose sand by volume, mixed dry in a mixing 
machine for not less than one minute after materials 
have been added. Introduce hydration at the cement 
gun nozzle, controlling water content so that no slump 
or dry pockets occur in placed material.. 
b. Provide 50 lbs. minimum air pressure at the cement 
gun when the material hose is 100 feet or less in 
length. Maintain: at least 15 lbs. greater water pressure 
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than air pressure at the nozzle. Do not use a nozzle 
whose tip pressure size is greater than 1-3A" diameter. 
c. Gunite the coves and up the walls shooting gunite at 
right angles to surfaces. Build up in layers of a 
thickness to prevent slumping, allowing time between 
layers for an initial set to occur. Cover the rein-
forcing with the first layer. Remove loose aggregate 
and rebound before placing succeeding layers. Do not 
re-use materials. 
d. Rod the surface to true lines upon reaching the thick-
ness and planes outlined by forms and ground wires. 
Remove ground wires and finish with a wood float. 
e. Do not place gunite during rain. Keep newly placed 
material moist for 5 days after placing. 
3.3 Finish and Trim 
a. Install the ceramic tile splash band and depth markers 
in the swimming pool. Furnish the deck markers to 
the decking installer. 
b. Scrub the rough interior gunite clean prior to applica-
tion of the finish plaster. During this operation, 
cap the main suction line and pump the dirty water out 
of the pool. 
c« With the rough interior surface wet, apply a scratch 
coat, using a mixture of one part portland cement to 
1-1/4 parts Landon Opalyte. Batch mix scratch coat 
materials and apply 1/8 thick, floating to a uniform 
plane. After initial set has occurred, lightly broom 
the scratch coat after which apply a finish coat of the 
same material and approximate thickness and trowel to a 
smooth, dense impervious surface. Apply this coat 
continuously to avoid lag-marks; avoid overtroweling 
in order to prevent trowel stains. 
-END-
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PART 1 - GENERAL 
1.1 Conditions: Division 0, Division 1 and Sections 15010, 
15050, 15120 and 15160 apply to the work of this Section. 
1.2 Principal Work In This Section 
a. Coordinate all work in this Section with related trades. 
b. Verify all dimensions at the jobsite. 
c. Whirlpool bath. 
d. Sauna equipment. 
1*3 Related Work In Other Sections 
a. Electrical connections. 
b. Sauna enclosures. 
1.4 Submittals: 
a. Submit manufacturer's catalogs and literature for the 
Architect's review before performing any work. 
b. Provide the appropriate trades with rough-in drawings 
of mechanical and electrical connections. 
PART 2 - PRODUCTS 
2.1 Whirlpool Bath; 10f diameter "Roman Spa Whirlpool" package,, as 
manufactured by American Leisure Holding Corp., Ft. Lauder-
dale, Florida, provided with the following items: 
a. Bronze pumps. 
b. 208 voltage. 
c. Two additional jets (total of 8 jets) and larger jet 
pump. 
d. 1-1/2 hp Hydro air blower. 
e. Timers. 
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(1) 1-60 minute. 
(2) 24 hour timer for filters and heater. 
f. Chlorinator and chemical kit. 
g. Chrome pipe handrail at steps. 
h. Color shall match American Standard's "Fawn Beige". 
i. Electric heater, filter and filter pump. 
j. Chemical maintenance kit. 
2.2 Sauna Equipment: As supplied by Custom Home Spas. Provide 
the following equipment for each sauna: 
a. 1 each 10 k.w. Sauna Heater Model M100B 208V. 
b. 1 each 8" x 10" Key Locked Tel Box. 
c. 1 each 24 HR Time Clock Model 14511. 
d. 1 each Thermostat Model MSP. 
e. 1 each Wood Sauna Door Handle. 
f. 1 each Thermometer Model YMCAT. 
PART ^ - EXECUTION 
3.1 Ship the whirlpool bath to the jobsite with all fittings 
for air and water secured in place and integral piping 
installed. 
3.2 Install whirlpool bath and sauna equipment in the locations 
shown in strict accordance with the manufacturer's printed 
instructions, so that they operate properly, as approved 
by the Architect. 
-END-
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